JACKSON v. PETERS

R. ALLAN EDGAR, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff Ginger J. Jackson brings the present action against defendant F. Whitten Peters, the Secretary for the Department of the Air Force. She claims that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment. (Court File No. 1). Presently before the Court is defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. (Court File No. 39). For the following reasons, this motion shall be DENIED.

I. Standard of Review

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment will be rendered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the Court must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 475, 587 (1986); Morris v. Crete Carrier Corp., 105 F.3d 279, 280-81 (6th Cir. 1997); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir. 1990); 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987).

Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations. The nonmoving party is required to come forward with some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the factual dispute at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); White, 909 F.2d at 943-44; 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the nonmoving party's case with respect to which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996).

The judge's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question, and not to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435-36. The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict. The Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; see also Lapeer County, Mich. v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 108 F.3d 74, 78 (6th Cir. 1997). There must be some probative evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1997). If the Court concludes that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, it may enter a summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; University of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1280 (6th Cir. 1995); LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993).

II. Facts

The following factual findings, made solely for purposes of ruling on the present motion for partial summary judgment, are taken in the light most favorable to Jackson, the non-moving party.

Plaintiff Jackson has been employed as a civilian at the Arnold Engineering and Development Center ("AEDC") since 1983. Beginning in August 1993, plaintiff worked as an employee of the AEDC's Defense Finance and Accounting System ("DFAS") as an accounting technician. In 1995, Jackson was hired by the AEDC's comptroller directorate. She remained as a civilian employee of the AEDC until her termination in 2001.

Jackson alleges that from 1995 through 1998, she was sexually harassed by Robert Russell Hood, a cost analyst subcontractor at the AEDC. Specifically, she contends that in January 1996, Hood entered Jackson's office, touched her breast, and said, "I'm going to have me some of this." Jackson told Hood to keep his hands off of her. However, shortly thereafter, Hood made comments to plaintiff that "[y]our problem is that your husband just doesn't know how to f___ you. I will show you how a real man does it." Additionally, Hood made "inappropriate gestures with his crotch area."

Jackson alleges that she began to complain to co-workers and supervisors, including Hood's wife, who was employed by the AEDC. One supervisor, Cheryl Burlingame Miller, instructed Jackson to "let the matter die" whether the allegations were true or not.

Sometime in 1996, Jackson alleges that Hood violently confronted her at work. In the presence of his wife, Hood yelled that Jackson had wrongfully accused him of inappropriate behavior. He threatened her life and the life of her family. Jeff Ross, a co-worker, overheard this conversation and reported it to several supervisors. However, no corrective action was taken.

Jackson alleges that Hood then began referring to her as "psychobitch" in the office. She further alleges that AEDC supervisors found this amusing and referred to Jackson as "psychobitch," too. Sometime during early February 1998, Hood told Jackson that "[i]f I had just f___ed you back then, you probably would not be going through this right now."

Immediately after this incident, Jackson complained again to her supervisor, who recommended that plaintiff contact an EEOC counselor. Plaintiff met with the counselor, Arthur Fuller, on February 23, 1998. Fuller suggested that Hood's presence on the AEDC base be limited to official business purposes after he telephoned and identified the time and location of his intended visits. Hood was also instructed not to enter Jackson's work area. However, plaintiff alleges that these precautions existed only on paper and were not enforced. In March 1998, Hood sent a photograph of himself, nude from the waist down, to Jackson through the AEDC base mail. Jackson filed a formal complaint of discrimination on March 18, 1998.

III. Analysis

Defendant first argues that Jackson has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court addressed this argument in its memorandum of October 17, 2000. (Court File No. 25). In that opinion, the Court explained that Jackson had sufficiently alleged a pattern and practice of discrimination from 1995 to 1998. As such, she could invoke the continuing violation doctrine, thus permitting her 1998 administrative complaint to serve as an exhaustion of administrative remedies for all alleged sexual harassment during that time.

Defendant does not actually dispute these findings in the present motion for partial summary judgment. Rather, defendant seeks to exclude evidence concerning certain actions and comments that occurred during the 1995 to 1998 time period. Specifically, defendant argues that "[t]he part of plaintiff's Judicial Complaint related to Cheryl Miller should be dismissed or summary judgment granted." (Court File No. 40, p. 7).

The Court notes, however, that plaintiff's complaint does not mention Miller beyond the allegation that she told Jackson not to pursue her allegations of harassment by Hood. Defendant refers instead to Miller's deposition testimony, in which Miller states that she started referring to Jackson as "psychobitch" because plaintiff started rumors that Miller had undergone cosmetic surgery when Miller had actually had a tumor removed from her breast. (Court File No. 40, Miller depo., p. 20-21). Jackson disputes that Miller began use of the term "psychobitch" and claims that Hood first began using that term. (Court File No. 43, Jackson aff. ¶ 8).

The Court finds that the evidence concerning references to plaintiff as "psychobitch" are relevant to the present action and admissible. See FED. R. CIV. P. 401, 403. Jackson alleges a pattern and practice of harassing comments and conduct, which was not ameliorated by her complaints to AEDC supervisors, including Miller. The Court finds no basis for excluding this proof at trial.

Defendant next argues that Jackson cannot establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment. The Court disagrees. To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, plaintiff must prove that (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon her protected classification; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance and created a hostile work environment; and (5) in the case of co-worker harassment, that the defendant knew or should have known about the harassing conduct and failed to take appropriate action. Moore v. Kuka, 171 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (6th Cir. 1999); Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997).

Defendant first disputes the severity and pervasiveness of the alleged hostile conduct. Title VII prohibits workplace conduct that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). The "severe and pervasive" element of a hostile work environment claim includes both objective and subjective components. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Not only must the victim have subjectively perceived the work environment to be hostile, but a factfinder must determine that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have agreed. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998). Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.

The Court finds that Jackson has alleged facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment at the AEDC. Considering all of Hood's lewd comments and actions, together with the common AEDC practice of referring to Jackson as "psychobitch," the Court finds that a reasonable jury could determine the existence of a hostile and abusive working environment. The record undisputedly indicates that Jackson found her environment to be so.

Finally, defendant argues that Jackson cannot establish her case because the AEDC took prompt, reasonable action in response to plaintiff's complaints. However, the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson, indicates the opposite proposition. Specifically, Jackson argues that she complained to supervisors about unwelcome harassment but was left unhelped. Miller went so far as to discourage her complaints against Hood. And even when Jackson contacted an EEOC counselor, the resulting precautionary measures regarding contact between Jackson and Hood were ignored by the AEDC management. Jackson raises genuine issues of material fact which require that this case be tried.

SO ORDERED.