ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A defendant attempting to vacate a default must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015[a][1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see, Roussodimou v. Zafiriadis, 238 A.D.2d 568; Bardales v. Blades, 191 A.D.2d 667, 668).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' motion to vacate their default. The defendants established that their default in appearing and answering the trial assignment part calendar call was not willful, but was the product of their understanding that the plaintiffs would not proceed to trial until 60 days after the injured plaintiff appeared for an independent medical examination as evidenced by the plaintiffs' stipulation and the prior order (see, Skinner v. Skinner, 90 A.D.2d 845). Furthermore, the defendants produced evidence of a meritorious defense (see, Colon v. Cruz, 277 A.D.2d 195; Hanak v. Jani, 265 A.D.2d 453; Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458).
RITTER, J.P., ALTMAN, McGINITY, SMITH and COZIER, JJ., concur.