DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The defendants in Action No. 1, City of New York, Citibank, and Stefanos Calogeras and Anna Calogeras (hereinafter the Calogeras), separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiff cross-moved to consolidate the actions and for further discovery. Subsequently, Golden Mark Maintenance Ltd. separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in Action No. 2. By order dated February 23, 2000, the Supreme Court granted the Calogeras' motion for summary judgment upon the stipulation of all parties. Thereafter, in the order appealed from, the Supreme Court granted the motions of the three remaining defendants for summary judgment dismissing both complaints.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the City of New York did not have sufficient time, as a matter of law, to notice and remove the ice from the sidewalk in front of Citibank's branch ( see, Gustavsson v. County of Westchester, 264 A.D.2d 408; Otero v. City of New York, 248 A.D.2d 689). Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary of either the lease provision in which Citibank assumed a duty to remove snow and ice from the sidewalks adjacent to the premises ( see, Kennedy v. CC New Main St. Corp., 269 A.D.2d 499), or of the contract between the defendant Citibank and the separate defendant Golden Mark Maintenance Ltd., since the contract, although very detailed as to its limited aspect, was not a comprehensive and exclusive property maintenance obligation which the parties could reasonably expect to displace the landowner's duty to maintain the property safely ( see, Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220; Bugiada v. Iko, 274 A.D.2d 368). Additionally, the plaintiff's assertion that possible repair work by Citibank may have exacerbated the natural hazard of the ice on the sidewalk was based upon mere supposition and is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment ( see, Penny v. Pembrook Mgt., 280 A.D.2d 590).
In light of the proper dismissal of the complaints in both actions, the Supreme Court correctly denied the plaintiff's cross motion as academic.