DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate so much of the judgment of divorce as related to the distribution of marital assets and to set a disclosure schedule and hearing date. She did not move to set aside the stipulation of the parties that was incorporated but not merged in the judgment, pursuant to which the disposition of marital assets was made. Despite evidence to the contrary, the plaintiff contends that the execution of the parties' stipulation was permeated by fraud because she was unrepresented by counsel. A court will not automatically nullify a stipulation on the ground that a party was not represented by counsel (see, Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 48; Chauhan v. Thakur, 184 A.D.2d 744, 745). Furthermore, the state of the defendant's assets in 1999 does not establish his wealth in 1994 at the time of the execution of the stipulation. There is no other basis to support her allegations of fraud. Similarly, her claim of duress is without merit because she failed to tie with any degree of specificity the defendant's alleged egregious conduct to her assent to the stipulation (see, McGahee v. Kennedy, 48 N.Y.2d 832, 834). She also accepted the benefits of the stipulation and judgment for nearly six years, thereby ratifying her agreement (see, Sheindlin v. Sheindlin, 88 A.D.2d 930, 931). In any event, because the plaintiff's allegations of fraud relate to the underlying transaction rather than to the procurement of the judgment itself, the plaintiff's motion was properly denied (see, Balatti v. Balatti, 232 A.D.2d 593, 594; Cofresi v. Cofresi, 198 A.D.2d 321).