DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
At the trial, the defendant challenged a prospective juror for cause. When his application was denied, he peremptorily challenged the juror. Since the defendant failed to exhaust his peremptory challenges, the propriety of the denial of the challenge for cause does not constitute a ground for reversal (see, CPL 270.20; People v. Lynch, 95 N.Y.2d 243; People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 97). The defendant's claim that the Supreme Court improperly curtailed the defense counsel's voir dire examination of the prospective juror, depriving the defense counsel of "potentially critical information" needed to decide whether to exercise a peremptory challenge or allow the prospective juror to remain on the jury, is contrary to the defendant's position at trial that the prospective juror should have been removed for cause. Therefore, that contention is not properly before us on appeal (see, People v. Espinol, 183 A.D.2d 407; People v. Caceras, 154 A.D.2d 310).
At the trial, the defendant's sole objection to the introduction of expert testimony concerning the practices of drug dealers was that the witness was not qualified. Accordingly, his present contention that the nature of the testimony was improper is unpreserved for appellate review.
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
ALTMAN, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, McGINITY and COZIER, JJ., concur.