The motion court was vested with broad power to accept or reject the Special Referee's report, including the power to make its own findings (see, Interlink Metals Chems. v. Kazdan, 222 A.D.2d 55, 59), and we do not find that power to have been improvidently exercised. Even if we were to countenance an argument by plaintiffs that no attorney fee award should be made, after they expressly confined their brief to an argument that we should confirm the Referee's award of $100,000, we would find that, because appellants have previously been found by this Court to have committed acts thoroughly warranting CPLR 3126 sanctions (see, Sage Realty v. Proskauer Rose, 275 A.D.2d 11, 16), the motion court had discretion to award attorney fees as such a sanction, and did not award an arbitrary amount (cf., Fontanella v. Fontanella, 167 A.D.2d 185). The motion court did not overly expand the scope of the original order of reference, which authorized consideration both of matters expressly stated and clearly implied therein (see, Julius Blumberg, Inc. v. 52 Habitat Co., 200 A.D.2d 482). Since the motion court reviewed the appropriate factors (see, Application of Karp, 145 A.D.2d 208, 215), there is no reason to disturb the amount of fees awarded (see, Antzakas v. Farmland Dairies, 202 A.D.2d 324, 325).
We find, however, that recovery of "fees on fees" should not be permitted under the circumstances of this case. It has been established that an award of fees on fees must be based on a statute or on an agreement (see, Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 429, 431, affd 64 N.Y.2d 958), and CPLR 3216, although relied upon by the motion court to authorize a fees on fees award in this matter, does not explicitly grant courts authority to award fees on fees, but only the general authority to impose such sanctions as "are just".
We have considered appellants' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.