ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff's motion was improperly designated as one for leave to renew and reargue. Since the evidence upon which renewal was sought was available to the plaintiff at the time when she submitted her opposition to the original motions for summary judgment, it did not constitute a proper ground for renewal. Thus, the motion was for leave to reargue (see, CPLR 2221; Santana v. Sterling, 278 A.D.2d 219; Kirkpatrick v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 255 A.D.2d 363), the denial of which is not appealable (see, Haggerty v. Agawam Realty, 271 A.D.2d 408).
We further note that by decision and order of this court dated September 15, 2000, the plaintiff's appeal from the order dated September 29, 1999, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The dismissal constituted an adjudication on the merits with respect to all issues which could have been reviewed therein, thus precluding review at this time (see, Rubeo v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 N.Y.2d 750; Bray v. Cox, 38 N.Y.2d 350; Gammal v. La Casita Milta, 278 A.D.2d 364; Matter of Keenan v. Albert, 273 A.D.2d 388).
RITTER, J.P., SANTUCCI, FEUERSTEIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.