LAURIE SMITH CAMP, United States District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the following motions for summary judgment filed in these consolidated cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56: Defendant Pro Transportation, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (8:00CV181, Filing No. 77; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 85); Plaintiffs' Gainey Transportation Services, Inc. and Gainey Insurance Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, (8:00CV181, Filing No. 80; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 88). Briefs have been received, and both the Defendant and Plaintiffs have filed evidence in support of their positions.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action involves a vehicular accident that occurred on December 19, 1999. According to the amended complaint, the accident occurred when a semi-truck driven by Jake Stanczyk and owned by Mr. Stanczyk's employer, Pro Transportation, Inc. ("Pro Transportation"), allegedly jackknifed and left the eastbound lanes of Interstate 80, colliding with a semi-truck in the westbound lanes of Interstate 80 driven by James Pond, Jr. and owned by Mr. Pond's employer, Gainey Transportation Services, Inc. ("Gainey Transportation" or "Gainey"). Jerry Adams was a passenger in the Gainey truck. (Filing No. 28.) Two other tractor-trailer trucks were in the westbound lanes of Interstate 80 driven by witnesses Steven Rowland and Larry Tremmel. The accident occurred on an open bridge, and the temperature was 31 degrees with light snow falling and blowing wind. Jake Stanczyk, James Pond, and Jerry Adams died. Plaintiffs allege that the accident resulted from Mr. Stanczyk's negligence.
The Defendant Pro Transportation seeks summary judgment in its favor and against the Plaintiffs, or alternatively, partial summary judgment. (8:00CV181, Filing No. 77; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 85.) Defendant Pro Transportation argues that the mere skidding of the Pro Transportation truck, absent more, cannot prove negligence. Defendant also argues that there is no evidence that Pro Transportation was negligent in the maintenance of its truck or in the retention of Mr. Stanczyk or the entrustment of its truck to Mr. Stanczyk.
The Plaintiffs seek summary judgment in their favor in the amount of $131, 296.86. (8:00CV181, Filing No. 80; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 88.) Plaintiffs argue that the accident was caused by Mr. Stanczyk's negligence by operating his truck at a speed that was excessive given the existing conditions and in failing to control his truck. The $131,296.86 was stipulated to by the parties in Exhibit 12 of the Plaintiffs' evidence, with the caveats that the Defendant does not acknowledge liability and that the Defendant reserves its right to challenge whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all or some of the listed damages.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harder v. ACandS, 179 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the function of the Court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court must "look to the substantive law to determine whether an element is essential to a case, and `[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Dulany v. Carhahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The Court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is "properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986).
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 2553.
In response to the proponent's showing, the opponent's burden is to "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 474 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis deleted); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 121 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048 (1998)). The nonmoving party must show more than "`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; [it] must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in [its] favor.'" Chism v. W.R. Grace Co., 158 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 475 U.S. at 586). Accordingly, the nonmoving party must "set forth in its opposing brief a separate statement of each material fact as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue to be tried and as to each shall identify the specific document or discovery response or deposition testimony (by page and line) which it is claimed established the issue." NELR 56.1(b).
Finally, although the Court may not weigh the credibility and persuasiveness of evidence in the context of a motion for summary judgment, if testimony has been irrefutably contradicted by documentary evidence, or the testimony is otherwise inherently incredible, it need not be credited even for purposes of a motion for summary judgment.Walker v. Peters, 863 F. Supp. 671, 672-673 (N.D.Ill. 1994).
Application of Standard
After careful consideration of the evidentiary materials submitted in support of and in opposition to both motions for summary judgment, the Court concludes that with regard to the issue of the alleged negligence of Mr. Stanczyk, factual disputes exist in this action such that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial including, but not limited to the speed at which Mr. Stanczyk operated his vehicle and whether such speed was reasonable given the conditions at the time of the accident. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Therefore, Defendant Pro Transportation, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (8:00CV181, Filing No. 77; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 85); Plaintiffs' Gainey Transportation Services, Inc. and Gainey Insurance Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, (8:00CV181, Filing No. 80; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 88), are denied.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Defendant Pro Transportation, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (8:00CV181, Filing No. 77; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 85), is denied; and
2. The Plaintiffs' Gainey Transportation Services, Inc. and Gainey Insurance Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, (8:00CV181, Filing No. 80; 8:00CV558, Filing No. 88), is denied.