Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Motions
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DEON DEWITT, Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOHN A. JARVEY, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the court pursuant to the defendant's September 12, 2001, motion to suppress evidence (docket number 38). The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on October 18, 2001, at which the defendant was present and represented by Wally Taylor. The government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Matt Cole. It is recommended that the motion to suppress be denied.

In the motion, the defendant seeks to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers on October 9, 2000, and October 18, 2000. He contends that the statements were made involuntarily. Specifically, the defendant contends that his mental and emotional problems combined with his voluntary ingestion of methamphetamine and allegedly deceptive police practices rendered his confessional involuntary. The court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On October 9, 2000, Special Agent Michael Dasso of the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement (IDNE) was conducting an investigation of methamphetamine trafficking in Maquoketa, Iowa. Defendant Deon DeWitt had sold methamphetamine to the police in controlled buy situations on two occasions earlier in 2000.

Special Agent Dasso and Darrell Simmons of the IDNE went to the DeWitt residence in Maquoketa in the afternoon. He was not home. Acting under the ruse of being general contractors looking for Mr. DeWitt to give a bid on a construction job, the police officers told the defendant's wife, Shelly DeWitt, that they would come back to see him later that afternoon. When they came back, the defendant was home. He anxiously got into Dasso's pick-up truck and they left the residence. After driving approximately a quarter of a mile, Dasso and Simmons identified themselves as police officers. Dasso told the defendant that he wanted his attention, that he should not be alarmed, and that he was not under arrest. He specifically informed the defendant that he was investigating the delivery of controlled substances and that Mr. DeWitt's name had come up in the investigation. Dasso informed the defendant that the police had made the controlled buys from him and that he was exposed to imprisonment by reason of this activity.

Dasso then described the benefits of cooperation, telling the defendant that under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the prosecutor could request a departure from the guideline ranges based on the defendant's assistance to law enforcement. Dasso was careful not to promise anything to the defendant other than that the information that he provided would be brought to the attention of the prosecutor.

Before speaking with the defendant, Dasso gave him his Miranda warnings. He also gave the defendant a cooperation statement, a one-page document describing the defendant's status and the government's expectations concerning cooperation. The first paragraph of the cooperation statement (Government's Exhibit 1) states the following: "I understand that I am not under arrest, that I am not in custody, and that I am free to leave at any time." In fact, the defendant had to choose that language by circling appropriate applicable language and then initialing the paragraph. Among the ten paragraphs that were read to the defendant and which he initialed, the defendant was informed that he could speak with an attorney of his choice at any time, he could stop cooperating with law enforcement officers at any time, and that he had no questions about his rights. Paragraph seven affirmatively states, "I, would like to provide information and other cooperation to law enforcement officers at this time." The statement is signed by Deon DeWitt in the presence of Special Agents Dasso and Simmons at 4:30 p.m. on October 9, 2000.

The defendant then gave a one-hour interview beginning at approximately 4:30 p.m. The record is somewhat unclear as to exactly where the interview took place; however, it is clear that most of the interview took place on the south side of Maquoketa at a location near a public swimming pool but in a cemetery. Special Agent Dasso stated that the cemetery has a hill on which the police can park and be able to observe others who might approach.

The defendant exhibited nervousness throughout the interview. He was crying and very anxious. At one point he requested to step out for fresh air and a cigarette and he was permitted to smoke a cigarette. The interview concluded when the defendant told the police that he was very nervous and thought he could remember more with an opportunity for further reflection. With that, the police drove him to his house and dropped him off.

The police were anxious to reconvene with the defendant's cooperation. On October 18, 2000, Darrell Simmons and Maquoketa police officer David Kauffman arranged to meet the defendant at the Community Center in Maquoketa. Although somewhat unusual, the defendant brought his wife, Shelly, with him. Kauffman, Simmons, and the DeWitts spoke for approximately one hour. The briefing began at approximately 6:20 p.m. Again, the defendant was upset but was considered an informant by this time. He and his wife both exhibited a desire to assist in order to reduce the defendant's criminal exposure. In fact, Shelly DeWitt agreed to purchase controlled substances for the police on a later occasion.

The defendant contends that his mental and emotional status was such that he had little ability to resist law enforcement officers. Months later, in June 2001, he began seeing a psychologist at the Gannon Center in Maquoketa and has been treated for depression and anxiety with panic attacks. His psychologist, Dr. John Curtis, testified at the hearing that the defendant has a habit of "catastrophizing," obsessing about the worst things that could possibly happen to him. As a result, he has difficulty sleeping, has suicidal ideations, and is extremely anxious. He can have panic attacks where he has difficulty functioning. Dr. Curtis stated that the defendant's legal problems are the source of his current psychological symptoms. Dr. Curtis was unable to state how long the defendant has been suffering from these problems but believes that it may be long-standing in light of his family history of depression. The defendant suffers from intense feelings of hopelessness and it takes very little to get him very upset. The police did not know any of this in October 2000.

In light of his condition, the defendant contends that three things in particular rendered his confessions involuntary. First, the police lied to him about being construction contractors. Second, they "sandwiched" him in the truck and then interrogated him at or near a cemetery.

The court finds that the defendant's statements were voluntary. It is obvious that the defendant suffers from depression and anxiety. The court does not doubt that these problems are long-standing and that they produce the symptoms described by Dr. Curtis; however, the defendant's current diagnosis arises out of his current inability to deal with his indictment and pretrial supervision. He certainly was nervous and anxious on October 9 and October 18, 2000; however, this condition as not produced by the police. It was produced by the fact that the defendant had been caught distributing controlled substances.

The police in this case told a lie in order to get the defendant alone. Once they were alone, the police officers told the truth about the evidence against the defendant, the likelihood of incarceration if the defendant were found guilty, and the benefits of cooperation. In Exhibit 1, they specifically told the defendant, and the defendant acknowledges by his own pen, that he was not under arrest, was not in custody, and was free to leave at any time. He was told and acted as though he specifically understood that he could speak with an attorney at any time, he could stop cooperating at any time, and stated that no promises, express or implied, had been made by the investigating officers. With that, he specifically stated that he wanted to cooperate with the police.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS

In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534, 538 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir. 1990). 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) provides:

The trial judge in determining the issues of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was within the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.

In light of the totality of the circumstances, a statement is not voluntary if "pressures exerted upon the suspect have overborne his will." United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1379 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1989) for the "overborne will" test). The two factors that must be considered in applying the "overborne will" doctrine are "the conduct of the law enforcement officials and the capacity of the suspect to resist pressure to confess." Id. (citing Jorgensen and Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)). A statement is not constitutionally involuntary unless "the police extorted it from the accused by means of coercive activity." Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Rohrbach, 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987)).

As stated more recently by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:

A confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the confession "was not secured through psychological or physical intimidation but rather was the product of a rational intellect and free will." We have in earlier cases found certain factors relevant to determining voluntariness: the age of the defendant, her education, the nature of the questioning, the use of physical punishment, whether the defendant was read her rights, the duration of the questioning, the defendant's prior experience with police, and whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
These factors must be assessed "from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant's position at the time of the statement," and in light of those factors.

United States v. Cichon, 48 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).

The defendant's claim of intoxication has been used before to challenge the voluntariness of confessions. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to adopt a per se rule of involuntariness when confronted with claims of intoxication and/or fatigue. United States v. Makes Room, 49 F.3d 410, 415 (8th Cir. 1995). The test is whether these mental impairments caused the defendant's will to be overborne. United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir. 1990). Where the defendant was coherent, composed and cooperative, confessed and cooperated quickly, and there was no substantial police coercion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly rejected voluntary drug intoxication as a reason to suppress a statement as involuntary. United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Makes Room, supra, at 415; United States v. Magness, 69 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Martin, 28 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534, 538-9 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Casal, supra, at 1229.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently highlighted the fact that voluntary drug intoxication is not reflective of whether the police used coercive activity. However, as noted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, if a mental impairment should have reasonably been apparent to the interrogators, special care should be exercised and a lesser quantum of coercion would render the confession involuntarily.

The defendant's mental or emotional state at the time the statements were made, did not make them involuntary. A defendant's mental condition alone is not enough to render a confession constitutionally involuntary; there must be coercive police activity. Larette v. Delo, 44 F.3d 681, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1995) see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1986). Although the defendant's ability to resist interrogation pressures is relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, his mental condition alone cannot make the statements involuntary. See Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir. 1993). A statement is not involuntary unless "the police extorted it from the accused by means of coercive activity." Id., quoting United States v. Rohrbach, 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). There is nothing inherently wrong with efforts to create a favorable climate for confession. Hawkins v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 900 (1988). In a case involving claims of involuntariness due to low I.Q., PCP intoxication, and mental illness, the Eighth Circuit denied the defendant's motion for suppression of his confession saying that the fact that the defendant was cooperative, reviewed and initialed each admonition of the waiver form, agreed to answer questions, and gave accurate information proved that the statements were voluntary. See United States v. Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1998). On the issue of the defendant Turner's alleged mental illness, the Court held that, "although Turner later exhibited `bizarre' behavior and may have exhibited signs of mental illness, the change in behavior does not show that at the time of his confession he lacked the mental capacity to waive his right." Id. at 556.

The defendant was picked up by two agents posing as general contractors in order to get the defendant alone. Once alone, the agents identified themselves and informed the defendant that he was not under arrest and he was free to leave at any time. He was read his Miranda warnings. The defendant was read the cooperation statement and he initialed and circled the language on the cooperation statement indicating that he understood his rights and waived them in order to begin discussions with the special agents. The defendant spoke for about one hour and was allowed out of the truck to smoke a cigarette. When he indicated to the officers that he wanted to go home and resume the talks later, the agents took the defendant back to his house. The defendant and the defendant's wife then voluntarily met an agent and a police office at a community center. Both the defendant and his wife were eager to cooperate. There is no evidence that the police activity on either occasion was coercive. His claims of mental or emotional problems hindering his ability to resist interrogation pressures fail because his mental or emotional trouble stem from his involvement in trafficking and using controlled substances and not due to any police conduct. The defendant is unable to prove any coercive behavior by the police, nor is he able to prove that his mental or emotional state at the time the statements were made caused his statements to be involuntary.

Upon the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that, unless any party files objections to the Report and Recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) within ten (10) days of the service of a copy of this report and recommendation, the defendant's September 12, 2001, motion to suppress evidence (docket number 38) be denied.

Objections must specify the parts of the report and recommendation to which objections are made. Objections also must specify the parts of the record, including exhibits and transcript lines, which form the basis for such objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1990).

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

U.S. v. DEWITT
(Nov 6, 2001)