LANGFORD v. FERRERA

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Equivalent Citations

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Docket Number

Case Nos. 1D00-3133, 1D00-3435, 1D00-3129

Attorney(S)

Robert F. Langford, Jr., Tallahassee, Pro se; Thomas M. Ervin of Ervin, Varn, Jacobs Ervin, Tallahassee, Attorney for Harold E. Regan; Marsha L. Lyons of Lyons Farrar, P.A., Tallahassee, Attorney for George E. Albritton. David A. Barrett and A. Dean Johnson of Barrett Associates and Belinda Takach France, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Judges

BROWNING, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This consolidated appeal arises from a final order entered on July 10, 2000, which awarded $101,000.00 in attorney's fees against appellants Harold Regan, Robert Langford, and George Albritton under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1997). The appellee, Martha Ferrera, as personal representative of the estate of Janie Elizabeth Albritton (deceased), argued that Albritton's claim as a creditor of the estate was barred by the statute of repose under section 733.710, Florida Statutes. Ferrera contended that even if the claim was not time-barred, Albritton was not entitled to reimbursement because the expenses were incurred without her authority. The appellants challenged this, asserting that the claim raised justiciable issues including estoppel, waiver or lack of notice, the nature of the expenses as post-death obligations not subject to the statute of repose, and a conflict of authority regarding the characterization of section 733.710. The trial court awarded attorney's fees to Ferrera, which led to this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Albritton's claim as a creditor of the estate was time-barred under section 733.710, Florida Statutes.
Whether Albritton was estopped from being barred by the statute of repose due to representations in the Notice of Administration.
Whether the expenses for which Albritton sought reimbursement were post-death obligations exempt from the statute of repose provisions.
Whether section 733.710 is a statute of repose or a statute of limitation, impacting the claim's justiciability.
Whether the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, based on the frivolousness of the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellee's Arguments

Albritton's claim was time-barred by the statute of repose under section 733.710.
Even if not time-barred, Albritton was not entitled to reimbursement because expenditures were made without Ferrera's authority.
The claim failed to present a justiciable issue of law or fact to overcome the statute of repose defense.
The claim was frivolous at its inception, justifying an award of attorney's fees under section 57.105.

Appellants' Arguments

Estoppel, waiver, or lack of notice because the statement of claim was filed within the three-month period specified by the Notice of Administration (NOA).
The expenses sought for reimbursement were post-death obligations of the estate (mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs) and are not subject to sections 733.702(1) and 733.710.
At the time the claim was filed, there was a conflict of authority regarding whether section 733.710 was a statute of repose or a statute of limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lambert v. Nelson, 573 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)	Requirement that a claim be completely devoid of justiciable issues to award attorney's fees under § 57.105.	Used to establish that attorney's fees are inappropriate if any justiciable issue exists.
Skalniak v. Dey, 737 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)	Standard for awarding attorney's fees under § 57.105 requiring absence of justiciable issues.	Supported the principle that an absence of justiciable issues is necessary for fees.
Demby v. English, 667 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)	Claims must be untenable on both facts and law to warrant fees.	Reinforced the standard for frivolous claims.
Muckenfuss v. Deltona Corp., 508 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1987)	Partial frivolousness does not justify attorney's fees if some justiciable issues exist.	Supported refusal to award fees where complaint alleges some justiciable issues.
Boyce v. Cluett, 672 So.2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)	Attorney's fees require absence of justiciable issues.	Confirmed the standard for awarding fees.
Schwartz v. W-K Partners, 530 So.2d 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)	Subsequent developments negating a claim's merit do not justify fees if initially non-frivolous.	Supported refusal to impose fees when claim was initially justiciable.
H.J.J., Inc. v. Party Productions, II, Inc., 738 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)	Attorney's fees require initial frivolousness of claim.	Applied to assess timing of frivolousness for fee awards.
Department of Revenue v. Petro, 765 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)	Elements of estoppel require misrepresentation of material fact and detrimental reliance.	Used to determine that estoppel defense was justiciable.
Mandarin Paint Flooring, Inc. v. Potura Coatings of Jacksonville, 744 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)	Elements of estoppel.	Supported the estoppel analysis.
May v. Illinois National Insurance Company, 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 2000)	Section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that bars untimely claims automatically and is not subject to waiver or extension.	Held that this decision does not retroactively affect the justiciability of claims filed before it.
Comercia Bank Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)	Section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.	Illustrated split of authority existing at the time of filing.
Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)	Section 733.710 is a statute of limitation and can be subject to estoppel.	Supported appellants' estoppel defense.
Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)	Post-death expenditures are not subject to probate statutes of nonclaim.	Supported the justiciability of claims for post-death expenses.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory framework under section 57.105, which permits attorney's fees only when there is a complete absence of justiciable issues of law or fact. It found that Albritton's claim raised two justiciable issues.

First, regarding estoppel, the court noted that Albritton filed his claim within the time period specified by the Notice of Administration (NOA) published and served by Ferrera's attorney. Because Albritton relied detrimentally on the NOA's representations, the court found a justiciable estoppel defense existed. Although the Florida Supreme Court later ruled in May v. Illinois National Insurance Company that section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim not subject to waiver, the court held that this ruling did not have retroactive effect to negate the justiciability of Albritton's claim when filed.

Second, the court recognized that Albritton's claim for reimbursement of post-death expenses—such as mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and repairs—was not barred by the probate code's statutes of nonclaim. This was supported by precedent distinguishing such post-death obligations from claims subject to the statute of repose.

Given these justiciable issues, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees under section 57.105 and reversed the order.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the trial court's award of attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

The decision directly affects the parties by vacating the fee award against the appellants. It establishes that claims raising justiciable issues—such as estoppel based on a Notice of Administration and post-death expenditures—cannot be deemed frivolous for attorney's fees purposes, even if subsequent authority clarifies the statute's scope. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond these facts but clarifies the application of existing rules regarding attorney's fees and justiciability.

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ROBERT F. LANGFORD, JR., Appellant, v. MARTHA JEAN FERRERA, as Personal Representati

BROWNING, J.

This is a consolidated appeal of a final order entered July 10, 2000, awarding $101,000.00 in attorney's fees against appellant-attorney Harold Regan (Regan), appellant-attorney Robert Langford (Langford) and appellant-client George Albritton (Albritton) (collectively "Appellants"), under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1997). Appellee-personal representative Martha Ferrera (Ferrera) argues that Albritton's claim as a creditor of the estate was time-barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes, the statute of repose, and even if the claim was not time-barred, Albritton was not entitled to reimbursement because the sums for which he sought reimbursement were expended without Ferrera's authority. Thus, Ferrera argues, Albritton failed to present a justiciable issue of law or fact to defeat Ferrera's statute of repose defense, the claim was frivolous at its inception, and attorneys' fees are warranted under section 57.105. Appellants argue the claim contains the following justiciable issues: (1) estoppel, waiver or lack of notice, because the statement of claim was filed within the three-month period specified by the Notice of Administration (NOA); (2) the expenses for which Albritton initially sought reimbursement were post-death obligations of the estate, which included mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and repairs and are not subject to the provisions of sections 733.702(1) and 733.710; and (3) at the time of the initial claim, there was a conflict of authority as to whether section 733.710 is a statute of repose or a statute of limitation. We agree that the claim made by Albritton presents justiciable issues for adjudication, and we reverse.

As a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, the trial court must find a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact raised by the losing party. See Lambert v. Nelson, 573 So.2d 54, 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990);Skalniak v Dey, 737 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The suit must be so clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and law as to be completely untenable. See Demby v. English, 667 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Lambert, 573 So.2d at 56. Even if a portion of the complaint is frivolous, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate so long as the complaint alleges some justiciable issues. See Muckenfuss v. Deltona Corp., 508 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1987); Boyce v. Cluett, 672 So.2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Furthermore, dismissal of a suit does not necessarily justify an attorney's fee award if the suit can be considered to have been non-frivolous at its inception. See Lambert, 573 So.2d at 56. If a suit can pass muster at the time it is initially presented, subsequent developments that render the claim without justiciable merit in law or fact should not subject the losing party to attorney's fees. See id.; Schwartz v. W-K Partners, 530 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); H.J.J., Inc. v. Party Productions, II, Inc., 738 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). In view of such precedents, Albritton's claim presented two justiciable issues.

Addressing, first, whether Albritton presented a justiciable defense of estoppel, we conclude he did. A party presents a justiciable defense of estoppel if he or she shows misrepresentation of a material fact upon which the party asserting estoppel detrimentally relied. See Department of Revenue v. Petro, 765 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), citingMandarin Paint Flooring, Inc. v. Potura Coatings of Jacksonville, 744 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Janie Elizabeth Albritton (decedent) died on February 1, 1995. On November 14, 1996, the attorney of the personal representative of the decedent's estate prepared and had published a NOA which provided that creditors, such as Albritton, had three months from the first date of publication or thirty days from service of the NOA in which to file a statement of claim. The record indicates Albritton was served with a copy of the NOA by certified mail on January 24, 1997. Thus, based upon the express representations of the NOA, Albritton had the later of February 14, 1997, or February 23, 1997, to file his statement of claim. Albritton filed his statement of claim on February 7, 1997. Because Albritton filed his statement of claim within the time period provided by the NOA issued by Ferrera, Albritton set forth a justiciable issue of estoppel against Ferrera's assertion that his claim is time-barred.

Appellant's estoppel defense cannot be deemed non-justiciable because May v. Illinois National Insurance Company, 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 2000), was decided after Appellant filed his claim.May held section 733.710 "is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims, and is not subject to waiver or extension in probate proceedings." See id. at 1157. However, when Appellant filed his complaint, there was a split of authority among our sister courts as to whether section 733.710 was a statute of limitation or a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim as was subsequently determined by May. See Comercia Bank Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that the court lacks the power to avoid); Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (section 733.710 is a statute of limitation, and estate could be estopped from asserting limitation as a defense to untimely claim). Thus, Appellant's estoppel defense was justiciable when filed, and the May decision has no retroactive effect on the justiciability of Appellant's claim.

Appellant also stated a justiciable claim for post-death expenditures, because such claims are not subject to the probate code's statutes of nonclaim. See Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); §§ 733.702 and 733.710, Fla. Stat.

Because Appellant stated a justiciable defense based upon estoppel and a justiciable claim for post-death expenditures, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we REVERSE.

WEBSTER and POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.