ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the arresting State Trooper had sufficient basis to stop her car for speeding (see, People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49; People v. Grear, 232 A.D.2d 578; People v. Salazar, 225 A.D.2d 804; People v. Coggins, 175 A.D.2d 924). Thereafter, the Trooper conducted a routine, noncustodial roadside interrogation (see, People v. Mathis, 136 A.D.2d 746) which resulted in the defendant's admission, confirmed by a radio check, that her Florida driver's license had been suspended; her passenger likewise was not licensed to drive the car. The trooper was thus within his authority to arrest the defendant, impound the car (see, People v. Irizarry, 282 A.D.2d 995; People v. Johnson, 254 A.D.2d 500; People v. Salazar, supra), and conduct an inventory search to ensure that the personal property seized therein was not dangerous, to secure valuable items, and to protect the police against false claims that such property was stolen, lost, or damaged (see, People v. Miller, 237 A.D.2d 535).
It is well settled that for a warrantless inventory search to be permissible, it must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a "single familiar standard" or established police procedure. That standard or procedure "must be rationally designed to meet the objectives that justify the search in the first place", and it must limit the discretion of the officer in the field; he may not use the stop as an excuse to rummage through the car (People v. Galak, 80 N.Y.2d 715, 719; see, People v. Antoine, 285 A.D.2d 649). Contrary to the defendant's conclusory assertions, the inventory search here met the above requirements (see, People v. Salazar, supra; People v. Miller, supra).
S. MILLER, J.P., LUCIANO, SCHMIDT and SMITH, JJ., concur.