DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
A special use permit confers authority to use property in a manner that is permitted by a zoning ordinance under stated conditions, and such a permit is required to be granted unless reasonable grounds exist for its denial (see, Matter of Carrol's Dev. Corp. v. Gibson, 73 A.D.2d 1050, affd 53 N.Y.2d 813; Matter of C.B.H. Props. v. Rose, 205 A.D.2d 686; Matter of Serota v. Town Bd. of Town of Oyster Bay, 191 A.D.2d 700). Where the denial of the special use permit is based on a claim of traffic congestion, there must be evidence that the proposed use would cause greater traffic congestion than an as-of-right use (see, Matter of Robert Lee Realty Co. v. Village of Spring Val., 61 N.Y.2d 892; Matter of Lerner v. Town Bd. of Town of Oyster Bay, 244 A.D.2d 336; Matter of Serota v. Town Bd. of Town of Oyster Bay, supra). Here, there was no evidence that the petitioner's proposed use of the property for a convenience store would have a greater impact on traffic than any as-of-right use. Moreover, the appellant's traffic expert conceded that the petitioner's proposed parking plan satisfied the relevant zoning laws. Therefore, as the denial of the petitioner's application for a special use permit was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion (see, Matter of Sasso v. Osgood, 86 N.Y.2d 374, 384), the Supreme Court properly granted the petition, annulled the determination, and directed that the permit be issued with reasonable conditions.
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.
McGINITY, J.P., LUCIANO, FEUERSTEIN and PRUDENTI, JJ., concur.