ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The revised Firearms Exclusion in the plaintiff's insurance policy with the defendant, known as TOW FA-1, reads:
"[i]t is understood that no coverage is afforded by this policy for any
injury, death, claims or actions occasioned directly or indirectly or as an incident to the discharge of firearms by person or persons on or about the insured premises".
This firearms exclusion became effective with the policy renewal of July 2, 1996. There is no merit to the plaintiff's contention that this represented a reduction in coverage from the original firearms exclusion. That exclusion, known as TOW-A, reads:
"[i]n consideration of any premium charged, it is understood and agreed that this policy does not apply to Bodily Injury and/or Property Damage arising out of the Ownership Rental, Maintenance, or Use of any Firearms".
Both provisions clearly exclude any claim arising out of any use by anyone of any firearm or firearms (see, Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Creative Hous., 88 N.Y.2d 347). Since there was no reduction in coverage, there was no requirement that the defendant give any notice under Insurance Law § 3426 (see, Cappelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 259 A.D.2d 581).
The plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court erred in finding that the delay in disclaiming from the time the defendant was first notified of the occurrence from the plaintiff's broker on April 21, 1997, until it sent its disclaimer letter dated June 18, 1997, was reasonable as a matter of law. This contention is without merit. Under the circumstances of this case, the delay was warranted by the defendant's need to investigate the occurrence, coupled with the inability of the defendant's investigator, through no fault of his own, to interview the plaintiff's principal and employees until May 13, 1997, and then write the report, which was sent June 2, 1997 (see, Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Brice, 72 A.D.2d 927, affd 50 N.Y.2d 958). The subsequent delay in disclaiming was clearly needed to allow the defendant to receive, evaluate, and act upon the report. Thus, the delay in disclaiming was clearly reasonable as a matter of law (see, Insurance Law § 3420[d]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 269 A.D.2d 860; Silk v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 103).
RITTER, J.P., KRAUSMAN, S. MILLER and FLORIO, JJ., concur.