ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The defendant met its initial burden of showing, as a matter of law, that it neither created the alleged clear, slimy condition upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell nor had notice of that condition (see, Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836; Negri v. Stop Shop, 65 N.Y.2d 625, 626). In opposition to the defendant's prima facie showing in support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the clear condition was visible and apparent, and whether it existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident to permit the defendant's employees to discover and remedy it (see, Kershner v. Pathmark Stores, 280 A.D.2d 583; Chemont v. Pathmark Supermarkets, 279 A.D.2d 545; Senglia v. FPL Foods, 273 A.D.2d 221). Furthermore, while the plaintiff argued that the defendant created the condition when its employee allegedly stacked a nearby display of bottles, there is no evidence, only speculation, that the condition was caused by the defendant's employee (see, Licatese v. Waldbaums, Inc., 277 A.D.2d 429; Meyerson v. Waldbaum, Inc., 265 A.D.2d 535; Whitt v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 258 A.D.2d 648; Goldman v. Waldbaum, Inc., 248 A.D.2d 436).
O'BRIEN, J.P., S. MILLER, McGINITY, SCHMIDT and TOWNES, JJ., concur.