ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
The appellant obtained a default judgment against the respondent in a prior foreclosure action. The respondent then commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud. Specifically, the respondent alleged that the default judgment in the foreclosure action was procured as a result of improper service of process on him.
The Supreme Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a collateral attack on personal jurisdiction in a prior action (see, Mitchell v. Insurance Co. of No. Amer., 40 A.D.2d 873; Tomasello Bros. v. Friedman, 57 Misc.2d 817). If personal jurisdiction was not properly obtained over the respondent in the prior action, his remedy is to move to vacate the default judgment in that action (see, CPLR 5015[a][4]; European Am. Bank Trust Co. v. Serota, 242 A.D.2d 363; Laurenzano v. Laurenzano, 222 A.D.2d 560). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted the appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
FRIEDMANN, J.P., SMITH, ADAMS and TOWNES, JJ., concur.