TATEM v. STATE

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Docket Number

No. 416, 2001.

Attorney(S)

William J. Tatem, pro se. Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.

Judges

Randy J. Holland

Acts

Crimes And Criminal Procedure — Specific Offenses — Offenses Against The Person — Kidnapping in the second degree; class C felony

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

William J. Tatem was convicted in 1984 by a Superior Court jury of Rape in the First Degree, Kidnaping in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. He received life sentences for the rape and kidnapping convictions, and additional incarceration terms for the weapon offenses. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by this Court in 1986. In 2001, Tatem filed a motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) seeking correction of his sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the kidnapping conviction. The Superior Court denied this motion, and Tatem appealed that denial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Tatem's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the jury instruction on kidnaping, object to certain trial testimony related to the kidnaping charge, and object to the sentence imposed.
Whether relief is available under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) for alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims that challenge the validity of the conviction rather than the legality of the sentence.
Whether Tatem’s motion is barred as untimely, repetitive, or formerly adjudicated under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 1985, Walsh, J., 1986 WL 16306 (Feb. 5, 1986)	Affirmation of convictions and sentences on direct appeal	Referenced to confirm prior affirmance of Tatem’s convictions and sentences, including kidnapping conviction.
Brittingham v. State, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 578 (1998)	Interpretation of Rule 35(a) as limited to correcting illegal sentences, not trial errors	Used to explain the narrow scope of Rule 35(a) relief and why ineffective assistance claims are not cognizable under that rule.
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962)	Clarification that Rule 35(a) is limited to correcting illegal sentences	Quoted to support the principle that Rule 35(a) does not permit reexamination of trial errors.
United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1992)	Definition of illegal sentence under Rule 35(a)	Quoted to delineate circumstances under which Rule 35(a) relief is available.
United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)	Examples of illegal sentences for Rule 35(a) purposes	Used to illustrate what constitutes an illegal sentence.
Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 829, 832 (1995)	Statute of limitations for Rule 61 motions	Applied to determine that Tatem’s postconviction motion was time-barred.
Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 26, 1992, Holland, J. (Mar. 5, 1992) (ORDER)	Procedural bar for repetitive postconviction motions	Referenced to show that Tatem had filed multiple prior motions, barring the current ineffective assistance claim as repetitive.
Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 1985, Walsh, J., 1986 WL 16306 (Feb. 5, 1986) (ORDER)	Former adjudication bar on sufficiency of evidence claim	Used to confirm that the sufficiency of evidence claim was previously litigated and rejected.
Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 959-60 (1988)	Interpretation of kidnapping charge rulings	Distinguished as applying prospectively only, thus not supporting Tatem’s claim.
Coleman v. State, Del. Supr., 562 A.2d 1171, 1179 (1989)	Prospective application of legal rulings	Supported the court’s conclusion that Weber does not retroactively apply to Tatem’s case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing that Rule 35(a) allows correction only of illegal sentences, not errors occurring before sentencing. Tatem’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which challenges the validity of the conviction rather than the legality of the sentence, falls outside Rule 35(a)’s scope. The Court then considered whether the motion could be treated as a postconviction motion under Rule 61. It found the motion untimely, filed more than three years after the conviction became final, and procedurally barred as repetitive and formerly adjudicated. The Court also rejected Tatem’s argument regarding insufficient evidence to sustain the kidnapping conviction, noting that this issue had been previously litigated and decided against him. Additionally, the Court distinguished the precedent cited by Tatem, clarifying that it applies only prospectively and thus does not undermine his conviction. Based on these principles, the Court concluded that Tatem’s appeal lacked merit.

Holding and Implications

The Court AFFIRMED the Superior Court’s denial of Tatem’s motion for correction of sentence.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold Tatem’s convictions and sentences as previously determined. The Court’s ruling reinforces the limited scope of Rule 35(a) relief and the procedural bars applicable to postconviction motions under Rule 61. No new precedent was established; rather, the decision reaffirms existing legal standards concerning ineffective assistance claims and procedural requirements for postconviction relief.

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WILLIAM J. TATEM, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.

HOLLAND, Justice:

The defendant-appellant, William J. Tatem, filed an appeal from the August 22, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for correction of sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). In this appeal, Tatem claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the jury instruction on kidnaping, object to certain trial testimony relating to the kidnaping charge and object to the sentence imposed. In essence, Tatem contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of Kidnaping in the First Degree.

We have carefully considered this matter. We have concluded that Tatem's appeal is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Prior Direct Appeal

In 1984 a Superior Court jury found Tatem guilty of Rape in the First Degree, Kidnaping in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. Tatem was given life sentences on each of the rape and kidnapping convictions, five years incarceration at Level V on the first weapon conviction and one year incarceration at Level V on the second weapon conviction. Tatem's convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.

11 Del. C. § 783A(4).

Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 1985, Walsh, J., 1986 WL 16306 (Feb. 5, 1986) (ORDER).

Rule 35's Limited Relief

Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." "The `narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence.'" "Relief under Rule 35(a) is available `when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-imposed limits, [or] violates the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . .'" "A sentence is also illegal if it `is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize.'"

Brittingham v. State, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 578 (1998) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962)).

Id. (quoting United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1992)).

Id. (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)).

Tatem does not contend that his sentence was outside the statutory authorization, constituted double jeopardy, or was ambiguous or contradictory. The only claim asserted in his Rule 35(a) motion involves alleged ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his kidnapping conviction and sentence. Because that claim would require an examination of the proceedings leading up to the imposition of sentence, no relief is available to Tatem under Rule 35(a).

Id. (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 430).

Rule 61's Bars

Even if deemed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, Tatem's motion is still unavailing. Not only is such a postconviction motion time-barred, it is procedurally barred as repetitive to the extent it alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. It is also procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated to the extent it alleges there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for kidnapping.

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (1). Tatem's motion was filed more than 3 years after the judgment of conviction became final. Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 829, 832 (1995).

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (2). As of 1992, Tatem had filed 4 previous postconviction motions. It does not appear that any of those motions included a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 26, 1992, Holland, J. (Mar. 5, 1992) (ORDER).

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4). This issue was previously litigated and decided against Tatem. Tatem v. State, Del. Supr., No. 131, 1985, Walsh, J., 1986 WL 16306 (Feb. 5, 1986) (ORDER). Tatem's contention that the Superior Court's kidnapping charge was improper is not supported by Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 959-60 (1988), since the rulings in that case apply prospectively only. Coleman v. State, Del. Supr., 562 A.2d 1171, 1179 (1989).

Conclusion

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.