ORDERED that the order is reversed, as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider (1) whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) whether the claimant was an infant or mentally or physically incapacitated, (3) whether the claimant had a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a notice of claim, and (4) whether the public corporation was prejudiced by the delay (see, General Municipal Law — 50-e[5]; Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256; Rogers v. City of Yonkers, 271 A.D.2d 593). The plaintiff failed to establish that the appellant was not prejudiced, the claim articulated in the proposed notice of claim had any merit, or the delay in attempting to serve the notice of claim was related to infancy or could be reasonably excused (see, Matter of Sheff v. County of Westchester, 279 A.D.2d 632; Matter of Bagnasco v. Suffolk County Water Auth., 272 A.D.2d 611; Saafir v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 260 A.D.2d 462; Matter of Finneran v. City of New York, 228 A.D.2d 596,597). Thus, the Supreme Court improvidently granted the plaintiff's motion and should have granted the defendant's cross motion to dismiss the action (see, General Municipal Law — 50-e[1][a]).
RITTER, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, FRIEDMANN, FEUERSTEIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.