DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the cross motion of the defendant Northland Marketing Corp., d/b/a Citgo (hereinafter Citgo), for summary judgment. An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employee, even when the employee's actions are intentional, if the actions were done while the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment (see, Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 302). However, there is no vicarious liability on the part of the employer for torts committed by the employee solely for personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer's business (see, Riviello v. Waldron, supra; Flowers v. New York City Tr. Auth., 267 A.D.2d 132; Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, cert denied 522 U.S. 967; Ray v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 221 A.D.2d 613, cert denied sub nom Ray v. Willett, 519 U.S. 822; Adams v. New York City Tr. Auth., 211 A.D.2d 285, affd 88 N.Y.2d 116; Kirkman v. Astoria Gen. Hosp., 204 A.D.2d 401). The actions of the defendant Milkid Singh, a gasoline attendant at Citgo, in striking and pushing the plaintiff when she inquired about the gasoline pump's meter while purchasing gasoline from Citgo were not incidental to the furtherance of Citgo's business and fell outside the scope of Singh's employment. Moreover, Singh's intentional conduct could not have reasonably been expected by his employer (cf., Helbig v. City of New York, 212 A.D.2d 506).
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Citgo had negligently hired, or failed to properly supervise Singh. The plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether Citgo knew or should have known of Singh's propensity for the conduct which caused the plaintiff's injury (see, Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, supra, at 161; Kirkman v. Astoria Gen. Hosp., supra, at 403; Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., 140 A.D.2d 278).
SANTUCCI, J.P., ALTMAN, FLORIO, H. MILLER and COZIER, JJ., concur.