VAUGHN R. WALKER, District Judge
Plaintiff Barbara Crawford filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) seeking judicial review of defendant's denial of her application for disability benefits. Doc. #1. The parties have made cross-motions for summary judgment.
I
On June 25, 1998, plaintiff applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Tr. 84-86. Petitioner claimed onset of disability on January 9, 1998, due to high blood pressure, back and neck pain, stress, mood swings and headaches. Tr. 97-103. Defendant denied the application, as well as plaintiff's request for reconsideration. Tr. 67-70, 72-75. On November 27, 1998, plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Social Security Administration. Tr. 76-77.
The ALJ, Donald F. Rector, conducted a hearing on November 16, 1999. Tr. 35. Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by her attorney. Id. On January 10, 2000, the ALJ issued a decision that plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits. Tr. 14-20. In the decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (RFC) for work at the light exertional level. Tr. 19. The ALJ further found that plaintiff cannot do any power gripping with her right hand and has mild difficulty in adapting to changed circumstances. Id. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled because she could perform her past relevant work as a customer service representative. Tr. 20.
On October 13, 2000, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 5-7. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
II
The ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits will not be disturbed unless (1) the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence on the record or (2) the decision is based on a legal error. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole and review evidence both supporting and detracting the ALJ's decision. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health Human Serv., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988).
The ALJ makes credibility determinations and resolves conflicts in medical testimony. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. If the evidence is "susceptible to more than one rational interpretation," the court will uphold the ALJ's decision. Id. at 1040. Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence must be set aside if the ALJ applied improper legal standards. See Brawner v. Secretary of Health Human Serv., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving her disability. Sanchez v. Secretary of Health Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987)
The ALJ found that plaintiff has the RFC to work at the light exertional level and can therefore do her past work as a customer service representative. Tr. 19-20. In making this finding, the ALJ relied primarily on the opinions of Dr. Paul R. Martin, examining psychologist, and Dr. James Jyh-Yenn Chen, treating internist. Tr. 16-17. The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Rick J. Trautner, plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, because it was based solely on plaintiff's subjective complaints of stress and anxiety. Tr. 17. Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Trautner's opinion, and (2) the ALJ's finding that plaintiff can return to her past relevant work was not supported by substantial evidence.
In determining plaintiff's mental capacity, the ALJ relied on the opinion of examining psychologist, Dr. Martin. Dr. Martin performed a clinical interview and administered several objective psychological tests. Tr. 165-66. He concluded that plaintiff's ability to relate to others is significantly disrupted, but that her ability to understand and follow instructions is unimpaired. Tr. 166. The ALJ discounted the portion of Dr. Martin's opinion regarding plaintiff's ability to relate to others because it was based solely on plaintiff's subjective complaints. Tr. 17. Dr. Martin also found that plaintiff's ability to maintain the appropriate level of concentration, pace and persistence necessary to perform simple tasks is unimpaired, although she might have difficulty with higher level tasks due to motivational factors. Tr. 166.
The ALJ rejected the opinion of treating psychologist, Dr. Trautner. Dr. Trautner's clinic notes contained few clinical findings, Tr. 189-95, 386-87, while explicitly concurring with plaintiff's subjective assertions. Tr. 194. From this, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Trautner's opinion was based on plaintiff's subjective assertions and therefore unreliable. Tr. 17.
Normally, great weight is given to a treating physician's opinion. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. To reject a treating physician's opinion which contradicts that of an examining physician, the ALJ must set forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so. Id. Here, the ALJ rejected Dr. Trautner's opinion because it was based on plaintiff's subjective complaints. This is a specific, legitimate reason. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). Also, an ALJ need not accept a treating physician's opinion which is brief and conclusory, with little in the way of clinical findings to support its conclusion. Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, to the extent a nontreating physician's opinion rests on objective clinical tests, that opinion must be viewed as substantial evidence. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. The ALJ properly relied on Dr. Martin's opinion.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was required to recontact Dr. Trautner to clarify the basis of his opinion. But because the ALJ had sufficient other evidence from which to determine plaintiff's disability, he had no obligation to recontact Dr. Trautner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c) (3) (2001). It was plaintiff's responsibility to produce evidence confirming Dr. Trautner's report. See Young, 803 F.2d at 968.
Likewise, the ALJ was not required to appoint a vocational expert to determine whether plaintiff's limited ability to adapt to changed circumstances would prevent her from performing her past work. Dr. Martin's testimony was substantial evidence that plaintiff's mental condition is not disabling. Where the plaintiff has not met her burden of proving disability, the ALJ is not required to call a vocational expert to prove that plaintiff could perform her past work. See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993)
To evaluate plaintiff's physical capabilities, the ALJ relied on the opinion of treating internist, Dr. Chen. Plaintiff saw Dr. Chen for complaints of numbness in both hands and pain in her right thumb and lower back. Tr. 155. Dr. Chen's impression was of right thumb osteoarthritis versus tendinitis, low back musculoskeletal pain, and possible diabetes in light of the sensory loss at her fingertips. Id. Because of these impairments, Dr. Chen concluded that plaintiff is limited in right hand motion and strength and cannot bend or tolerate prolonged walking. Id. Still, Dr. Chen found that plaintiff could lift up to 25 pounds. Id.
The ALJ also noted that another medical examiner had diagnosed plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome as "mild" for which only conservative treatment was recommended. Tr. 16, 369. Similarly, a State Agency medical advisor said that plaintiff was essentially unrestricted physically except for occasional limitations in her ability to climb. Tr. 156-63.
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff retains the RFC for work at the light exertional level, but that she cannot do any power gripping with her right hand. Tr. 19. The ALJ found that plaintiff could return to her prior work as a customer service representative. Tr. 17. This work involved taking orders over the telephone, inputting data into her computer, filing, making daily reports and using the copy and fax machines. Tr. 19. These tasks are consistent with plaintiff's abilities, as described in the medical testimony upon which the ALJ relied. To the extent that evidence regarding plaintiff's right thumb is ambiguous, the ALJ was entitled to resolve those ambiguities as he did. See MacTallanes, 881 F.2d at 750.
Plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that her impairments prevent her from doing her past work. See Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 511; see also Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680 ("The mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability."). Plaintiff apparently told treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Vatche Cabayan, that her arm impairment had nothing to do with her not working. Tr. 203. Plaintiff has not provided contrary evidence that the impairment prevents her from doing her past work.
Because the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and there was no legal error, the ALJ's decision will not be disturbed. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and motion to remand (Doc. #11) are DENIED and defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. #14) is GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to the order granting defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment issued on January 2, 2002;
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED, pursuant to Rule 58, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.