ROBERT E. JONES, U.S. District Judge
This disability discrimination in employment case was tried to a jury on October 29 through November 2, 2001. After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. With respect to liability, the jury found for plaintiff on her retaliation claim and against her on her failure to accommodate and disability discrimination claims. The jury awarded plaintiff $150,000 in compensatory damages and, with particular relevance to the present proceeding, $25,000 in past wages and "$ .00" in future wages. Taylor v. Fred Meyer, Inc., Civil No. 99-1781-JO (Verdict, November 2, 2001).
The case is now before the court on plaintiff's motion and amended motion (## 103, 105) for court awarded back pay and front pay. For the reasons stated below, I adopt the jury's findings and, consequently, deny plaintiff's motions.
DISCUSSION
At the beginning of trial, I informed counsel that I would submit plaintiff's equitable claims for back pay and front pay to the jury on an advisory basis only and would consider the jury's findings on those issues. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c) and 52(a). I discern no reason to revisit that ruling at this time.
The Supreme Court recently held that front pay, like back pay, is a form of equitable relief under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and is excluded from the statutory cap set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). See generally Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001). Pollard casts some doubt on the continuing validity of the statement in Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987) (an age discrimination case on which defendant relies), that "[i]f the court concludes that reinstatement is not feasible, the jury then decides the amount of the front pay award." See, e.g., Pals v. Schepel Buick GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 500-01 (7th Cir. 2000) ("whatever discretion the facts allow with respect to back pay and front pay belongs to the judge rather than the jury," but the "judge must respect the findings implied by the jury's verdict").
1. Back Pay
Plaintiff contends that she should be awarded back pay in the total sum of $58,656.79 because defendant "did not put on any evidence to refute those figures" and, according to plaintiff, defendant failed to show that she did not use reasonable diligence in obtaining a new job. I disagree.
The evidence established that plaintiff is highly trained and experienced in apparel design and product manufacturing. Yet after defendant terminated her, she took very little action to secure a new job. According to her testimony, over a period of a year, she sent out six or seven resumes, made a few phone calls, reconnected with her "network," and did some internet-based job research through the state employment division. She had an opportunity to apply for a different job with defendant, but did not pursue that opportunity. Plaintiffs' somewhat lackadaisical approach to her job search — which she ascribed in part to feelings of depression — eventually yielded two interviews and one job offer, from Forester, which she accepted.
Depression for which she evidently declined treatment. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 50.
Plaintiff argued to the jury that it should award back pay in the sum of $58,656.79. Having heard and evaluated all the evidence, the jury found that she was entitled to $25,000 in back pay. The exact reasons for the jury's decision are, of course, unknown, but based on the evidence presented at trial I find that plaintiff was not reasonably diligent in her job search and that, had she been, she could have found substantially equivalent employment much sooner than she did. Consequently, I adopt the jury's award of $25,000 in back pay, together with the findings implied by that verdict, as my own. See Pals v. Schepel Buick GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir. 2000).
2. Front Pay
Plaintiff seeks an award of front pay in the sum of $91,685.59 ($118,000 reduced to present value). In its verdict, the jury awarded plaintiff "$ .00" in front pay. I concur with the jury that plaintiff did not establish that an award of front pay is appropriate in this case.
Plaintiff was laid off from her job at Forester on October 17, 2001, less than two weeks before trial. Not surprisingly, in the few days before trial she had taken very little action to secure a new job. But also not surprisingly, because of the recency of the layoff, at trial plaintiff offered little more than pure speculation in support of her claim for front pay. Plaintiff asked the jury and now asks this court to speculate (1) that she would remain completely unemployed for one year; (2) that she would never again earn as much as she expected to earn as defendant's employee; and (3) that had she not been terminated, she would have remained employed by defendant for 15 years, until she retired. The evidence failed to support any of those three factual scenarios.
With respect to plaintiff's theory that she would have remained in defendant's employ for 15 years (until retirement), the evidence clearly established that plaintiff frequently changed jobs, averaging no more than 16 months in any one job during the course of her career.
More significantly, I instructed the jury that "[d]amages means the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury you find was proximately caused by the defendant." Jury Instruction No. 20 (emphasis added). The jury reasonably could have found that having obtained a job with Forester and having worked that job for 16 months before being laid off, plaintiff's future wage loss, if any, was not "proximately caused" by any conduct of defendant, but instead was caused by a variety of other factors, including Forester's business decisions and the condition of the economy in October 2001.
Neither party took an exception to that language.
See also footnote 3, supra.
I find that plaintiff failed to prove both causation and the amount of any future wage loss. Consequently, I adopt the jury's finding that plaintiff is not entitled to front pay.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion and amended motion (## 103, 105) for court awarded back pay and front pay are DENIED. Judgment will be entered in accordance with the jury verdict and this opinion. Any other pending motions are denied as moot.