This court's dismissal of appellant's appeal from the order of October 21, 1999 for failure to prosecute precludes consideration of appellant's present appeal from the order entered March 31, 2000, insofar as such order denied reargument and/or renewal, since the issues appellant seeks to raise on its appeal from the portion of the March 31, 2000 order denying reargument and renewal are the same issues that would have been raised had it perfected its appeal from the order of October 21, 1999 (see, Rubeo v. Natl. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 93 N.Y.2d 750, 754; Bray v. Cox, 38 N.Y.2d 350, 353). In any event, the denial of reargument is not appealable (see, Lichtman v. Mount Judah Cemetery, 269 A.D.2d 319, 320,lv denied in part and dismissed in part 95 N.Y.2d 860), and, to the extent that the appellant also purportedly sought renewal, it is clear that no new or previously unavailable facts were alleged in support of the application thereof and that the motion was actually one for reargument only (see, Toribio v. J.D. Posillico, Inc., 268 A.D.2d 394, 395).
As for the appellant's belated request to amend the amount of damages being claimed, as well as the theory underlying its claim for such damages, while leave to amend is, in the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, generally freely given, in view of appellant's utter failure to offer a reasonable excuse for its long delay in seeking amendment, the denial of its motion to amend constituted a proper exercise of discretion (see, Hanford v. Plaza Packaging Corp., 284 A.D.2d 179, 180; Konrad v. 136 East 64th St. Corp., 246 A.D.2d 324, 325; Cseh v. New York City Tr. Auth., 240 A.D.2d 270, 272).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.