SARAH S. VANCE, United States District Judge
Before the Court is plaintiff's motion to remand. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gary Moore filed a personal injury action against defendants James Berry Kerr, James Sturdivant, Larry Fowler Trucking, Inc., and Wausau Insurance Company, in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. Moore's petition stated that the accident occurred at the intersection of Russell Avenue and Chambers Ave, but did not identify the city or state. (Pet., at 2.) The complaint did not state that the accident occurred at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station, a United States military base.
On June 21, 2001, plaintiff's counsel sent to defendants plaintiff's answers to Interrogatories and Request for Documents. (Opp. Mot. to Remand, Ex. C.) As his answer to interrogatory 15, plaintiff refers to an attached incident report prepared by the military personnel. ( Id.)
Moore was deposed on August 29, 2001. In his deposition, he specifically stated that the accident occurred on the Belle Chase Naval Academy. (Opp. Mot. to Remand, Ex. B., Dep. Moore, at 47-50. On October 3, 2001, defendants were sent a read and signed copy of Moore's deposition. ( Id., Ex. B.) Defendants assert that they did not receive a copy until October 4, 2001.
Defendants removed this case asserting federal enclave jurisdiction on November 5, 2001, arguing that Moore's certified deposition constituted the first "other paper" informing them that the accident occurred on federal property. Plaintiff argues that removal was untimely and moves this Court to remand the case.
II. Discussion
A. Standard
A defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in state court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Here, defendants asserted federal enclave jurisdiction on the basis that the accident occurred on a United States miliary base. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 2001). See Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1952).
Plaintiff contends that defendants' notice of removal was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of receipt of plaintiff's pleading and in the alternative, it was not filed within thirty days of receipt of plaintiff's answers to interrogatories.
"Removal statutes are to be construed strictly against removal and for remand and a failure to timely file a notice of removal is a defect that requires remand to state court." Delaney v. Viking Freight, Inc., 41 F. Supp.2d 672, 674 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (quoting Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotes omitted), and citing Royal v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 685 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1982)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which sets forth the general procedure for removal, a determination of whether a defendant timely removed a case is essentially a two-step process. See Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1992). First, if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable, a defendant has thirty days from receipt of the initial pleading to file a notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Chapman, 969 F.2d at 161. The Court finds that this case was not initially removable because the petition did not reveal on its face the location of the accident or state that the accident occurred on a federal military base. The initial petition merely stated that the accident occurred at a particular cross street, but did not identify the relevant city or state. (Pet., at 2.)
Second, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable then:
a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, defendants claim that the first "other paper" indicating that the accident occurred on a federal military base was the October 4, 2001 signed and read copy of plaintiff's deposition testimony, in which plaintiff stated that the accident occurred on the Belle Chasse Naval Air Station. (Opp. Mot. to Remand, at 5.)
The Fifth Circuit in Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993), held that for purposes of removal under section 1446(b), "[t]he thirty days is measured from receipt of whatever writing . . . constitutes first notice." The Fifth Circuit has also held that only a voluntary act of the plaintiff can trigger the thirty day removal period based on defendant's receipt of "other paper." S.W.S. Erectors, Inc., v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff's answer to interrogatories may constitute a voluntary act sufficient to qualify as "other paper" under the statute. Chapman, 969 F.2d at 164 ("Clearly the answer to interrogatory . . . is such an `other paper.'"). See also Hines v. AC and S Inc., 128 F. Supp.2d 1003, X (N.D. Tex. 2001) (finding discovery answers to be an "other paper" sufficient to provide notice of federal enclave jurisdiction).
The Court disagrees with defendants' argument that the signed and read copy of plaintiff's deposition was the first "other paper" from which defendants could ascertain the location of the accident. On June 21, 2001, as plaintiff's answer to defendants' interrogatory 15, he refers to an attached incident report prepared by the military personnel. ( Id.) Such a document informed defendants that the accident occurred on a military base. The Court rejects defendants' argument that attaching an incident report is not a voluntary act sufficient to qualify as "other paper." (Opp. Mot. to Remand, at 5.) Here, plaintiff answered interrogatory 15 with the miliary incident report. ("See Incident report and Petition for damages.") Such an answer more than adequately informed defendants that the accident occurred on a military base.
The Court therefore concludes that the first "other paper" from which defendants were able to ascertain that the suit was removable was the June 21 answers to interrogatories rather than the October 5 transcript of the deposition testimony. Defendants did not file their notice of removal until November 5, more than thirty days after receipt of the answers to interrogatories. Accordingly, because defendants failed to timely remove, the Court grants plaintiff's motion to remand.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED. This case is hereby remanded to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans for further proceeding.