CONTROL TECHNIQUES v. JOHNSON

BOEHM, Justice.

This case deals with the relationship between the Comparative Fault Act and the common law tort doctrine of superseding or intervening cause. The requirement of causation as an element of liability for a negligent act includes the requirement that the consequences be foreseeable. A superseding cause that forecloses liability of the original actor is, by definition, not reasonably foreseeable by a person standing in the shoes of that actor. Accordingly, the doctrine of superseding cause is simply an application of the larger concept of causation. Because an instruction on superseding cause would only further clarify proximate cause, the trial court's failure to give a separate jury instruction on superseding cause was not reversible error.

John Johnson sustained serious burns to his arms and face in December of 1991 while measuring the voltage of a circuit breaker at the LTV Steel Plant in East Chicago, Indiana. A jury awarded him $2,000,000 and allocated eighty percent liability to Meade Electric Co., Inc., which installed the breaker, fifteen percent to Johnson, and five percent to Control Techniques, Inc. (Control), which designed and built the circuit breaker. Control was thus ordered to pay $100,000, representing its five percent of the total.

We grant transfer to discuss one of the four issues Control raised on appeal: whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing Control's tendered jury instruction on the doctrine of superseding or intervening cause. Essentially, Control contended that Meade's method of installing the breaker was a superseding cause of the accident that foreclosed any liability Control may have had from the breaker's design and manufacture. The Court of Appeals concluded that the instructions on fault causation adequately covered the subject.Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 737 N.E.2d 393, 402 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). We essentially agree with the Court of Appeals, but grant transfer because of varying formulations of this issue reflected in recent Court of Appeals opinions.

The doctrine of superseding or intervening causation has long been part of Indiana common law. It provides that when a negligent act or omission is followed by a subsequent negligent act or omission so remote in time that it breaks the chain of causation, the original wrongdoer is relieved of liability. Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976, 981 (Ind. 1999). A subsequent act is "superseding" when the harm resulting from the original negligent act "could not have reasonably been foreseen by the original negligent actor." Id. (quoting Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Ind. 1994)). Whether the resulting harm is "foreseeable" such that liability may be imposed on the original wrongdoer is a question of fact for a jury.

The plaintiffs argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the doctrine has been incorporated into Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, which allocates damages among the parties according to their respective negligence. They argue that the need for the doctrine is obliterated because a defendant is liable only for the amount of damages traceable to his or her conduct and that a simple jury instruction on proximate cause is sufficient. Control responds that cases subsequent to the passage of the Act have discussed the doctrine favorably. It argues that there was evidence in the record to support an instruction on superseding causation and, therefore, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give the instruction.

The Comparative Fault Act was adopted in Indiana in 1983 and went into effect in 1985. Ind. Code § 34-4-33-1 to -12 (1993) (recently recodified at I.C. 34-51-2). Some version of comparative fault has been adopted by statute in well over half of the fifty states, and several other jurisdictions have adopted comparative fault principles by judicial decisions. See Matthew Bender, 3 Comparative Negligence app. I (2001). The effect of comparative fault on various common law defenses to tort claims has since been a topic of debate in this state, e.g., Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ind. 1995), and other jurisdictions that have adopted a comparative fault scheme, e.g., Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d 386, 391 (N.M. 1999). In particular, many courts have addressed the common law doctrines of assumption of risk and last clear chance. The superseding cause doctrine has been the focus of less debate, but, in this jurisdiction, that doctrine has been viewed by some as subsumed in the Act, and by others as retaining continued viability. Compare Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 504 ("As a comparative fault statute, the [Act] eliminated contributory negligence as a complete defense, as well as other common-law defenses.") (emphasis in original), and L.K.I. Holdings, Inc. v. Tyner, 658 N.E.2d 111, 120 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) ("The comparison of fault inherent in the doctrine of intervening cause has been incorporated into our comparative fault system."),with Vernon, 712 N.E.2d at 981 ("The law also recognizes the doctrine of intervening and superseding cause."), and Straley v. Kimberly, 687 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997) (discussing doctrine of intervening cause).

For the reasons expressed below, we agree with the Court of Appeals that no separate instruction is required. In capsule form, we conclude that the doctrines of causation and foreseeability impose the same limitations on liability as the "superseding cause" doctrine. Causation limits a negligent actor's liability to foreseeable consequences. A superseding cause is, by definition, one that is not reasonably foreseeable. As a result, the doctrine in today's world adds nothing to the requirement of foreseeability that is not already inherent in the requirement of causation.

Under Indiana law, a negligent defendant may be liable for a plaintiff's injury if his or her action is deemed to be a proximate cause of that injury. Whether or not proximate cause exists is primarily a question of foreseeability. As this Court recently stated, the issue is whether the injury "is a natural and probable consequence, which in the light of the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated." Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind. 2000). As a result, liability may not be imposed on an original negligent actor who sets into motion a chain of events if the ultimate injury was not reasonably foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission. Havert v. Caldwell, 452 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. 1983);see also 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 596 (1989) ("[T]he question of [superseding] cause is simply a question of whether the original act of negligence or an independent intervening cause is the proximate cause of an injury."). Section 442 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) also lists factors to be considered in determining whether the intervening force may be deemed a superseding one:

(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;

(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation;

(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation;

(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or his failure to act. . . .

The sum of all this is that, in order to be liable for a plaintiff's injury, the harm must have been reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, in this case the original negligent actor. This is the case if there is only one negligent act or omission and it is equally true in the case of a negligent act or omission followed by a "superseding" act or omission. These propositions were valid both before and after the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act. See Torres, 987 P.2d at 392 ("[T]he doctrine [of superseding cause] reflects traditional notions of proximate causation and the need to limit potentially limitless liability arising from mere cause in fact.").

The Comparative Fault Act addressed two major concerns. Before adoption of the Act, a defendant whose negligence contributed only slightly to the plaintiff's loss could be required to pay for all of the plaintiff's damages and the plaintiff could proceed against and collect from the defendant of choice. See Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Ind.Ct.App. 1979). Because there was generally no right of contribution, a defendant only slightly responsible could be liable for the entire amount of damages. Similarly, comparative fault abolished the harsh common law rule that a plaintiff contributorily negligent to any degree was barred from all recovery. See Heck, 659 N.E.2d at 504; L.K.I. Holdings, Inc., 658 N.E.2d at 119; see also Sizemore v. Montana Power Co., 803 P.2d 629, 634 (Mont. 1990). In short, the Act did not change the standard for imposing liability. Rather, it changed the apportionment of the damages flowing from that liability. Enactment of comparative fault preserved the requirement of proximate cause as a requirement of liability.

Under the Comparative Fault Act, liability is to be apportioned among persons whose fault caused or contributed to causing the loss in proportion to their percentages of "fault" as found by the jury. I.C. § 34-51-2-8; Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 541 (Ind. 2000). As a result, the jury is first required to decide whether an actor's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. To say there is a "superseding cause" foreclosing one actor's liability is to say that the superseding event was not reasonably foreseeable to that actor. This is simply another way of saying, in comparative fault terms, that the original actor did not cause the harm and receives zero share of any liability.

Here, the trial court refused Control's jury instruction on intervening cause, which is drawn verbatim from Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 5.41 (2d ed. 2000):

An intervening cause is an action by a third party or agency that breaks the causal connection between the defendant's alleged negligence and the plaintiff's injury. This intervening cause then becomes the direct cause of the injury.

If you decide that the injury to the plaintiff would not have occurred without the action of the third party or agency, then the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant.

However, if you find that the defendant acted negligently and could have reasonably foreseen the actions of the third party or agency, then the defendant can still be liable for the defendant's injuries.

In reviewing a trial court's decision to give or to refuse tendered instructions, this Court considers: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions which are given. Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ind. 2001). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Control's instruction. There is evidence in the record to support the giving of an instruction on superseding cause. However, to the extent that this instruction is a correct statement of the law, the substance of it was covered in the court's final instruction number 17: "`Proximate cause' is that cause which produces injury complained of and without which the result would not have occurred. That cause must lead in a natural and continuous sequence to the resulting injury."

Trial courts may properly elect to give an instruction on this doctrine if they conclude it would aid the jury in determining liability. However, this call is better left to the discretion of the trial courts, as they are in the best position to determine whether an instruction on superseding cause is useful. It was not error to instruct only on causation.

We conclude that the adoption of the Comparative Fault Act did not affect the doctrine of superseding cause, but on the facts presented here the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine. On all other issues, the Court of Appeals is summarily affirmed. Former Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B) (now App.R. 58(A)(2)). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur.

DICKSON, J., dissents with separate opinion.