Since plaintiff's motion was not made until more than one year and 90 days after the accrual of her cause of action, the motion court was without discretion to permit her to file a late notice of claim with respect to the alleged medical malpractice of defendant doctors, who, at the time of the purported malpractice, were employees of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (see, General Municipal Law §§ 50-e, 50-i; Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950; Lopez v. Lincoln Hosp., 272 A.D.2d 275). Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is to be invoked sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances (see, Ceely v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp., 162 A.D.2d 492; Matter of Gross v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp., 122 A.D.2d 793, 794), may not, under the circumstances presented, be utilized to preclude defendants' reliance on the notice of claim provisions. In this connection, we perceive no basis for plaintiff's contentions that certain conduct by Jacobi Hospital staff, i.e., delay in the production of medical records and misinforming plaintiffs as to whether defendant Sallis was on staff at Jacobi Hospital, was "calculated to mislead" plaintiff or otherwise prevent her from timely asserting her malpractice cause of action (see, Kuhlman v. Westfield Mem. Hosp., 212 A.D.2d 1007).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.