Petitioner has not demonstrated that CDRB's determination or the underlying agency determination was affected by fraud, bad faith or palpable error, the standard of review specified in the subject contract (see, Cipico Constr., Inc. v. City of New York, 279 A.D.2d 416). Nor has petitioner demonstrated that CDRB or the agency acted erroneously, arbitrarily, capriciously, or in violation of lawful procedure (see, CPLR 7803; Matter of Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ., 93 N.Y.2d 361, 363).
The CDRB's finding that petitioner was responsible for the City's inability to fulfill its contractual obligation to modify its United Stated Army Corp of Engineers (COE) dredging and disposal permit, which led petitioner to substitute, at a higher cost, a Virginia disposal facility for the Pennsylvania disposal facility designated in its bid, was not arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner was contractually obligated to provide a lawful and permitted disposal facility and the record demonstrates that the COE would not modify the City's permit because the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources would not allow the Pennsylvania facility to accept the New York materials without an amended permit, which petitioner did not obtain. This prevented the City from fulfilling its contractual obligation (see, Vandegrift v. Cowles Eng'g. Co., 161 N.Y. 435, 443).
Nor was the challenged determination the product of unlawful procedures because the Agency Head and/or Comptroller considered ex-parte written and/or oral communications from the City. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands (see, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-335). Here, petitioner received all of the process provided for in the Procurement Policy Board rules and contract. Under 9 RCNY § 4-09(d)(1) [formerly 9 RCNY § 5-11(d)(1)], petitioner had the right to demand relevant documents which were not produced, but did not do so at the Agency Head review level. Under the contract and 9 RCNY § 4-09(d)(2) [formerly 9 RCNY § 5-11(d)(2)], the Agency Head had authority to make inquiries of Department of Sanitation personnel to assist her in the investigation. In any event, petitioner was provided with the relevant documents at the CDRB stage and did not show prejudice from the belated disclosure. In addition, petitioner had a viable post-deprivation remedy in the form of an Article 78 proceeding. The foregoing provided petitioner with all the process it was due (see, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Trans. Auth., 82 N.Y.2d 47; Skanska Tunneling, Inc. v. City of New York, 247 A.D.2d 344, appeal dismissed 92 N.Y.2d 844).
Nor was the CDRB determination affected by an error of law, based on the CDRB's failure to construe the letter drafted by the City to modify the parties' contract so as to increase the contract price. The subject contract provided that changes may be made only as authorized by the City and that vendors deviating from the contract without a duly approved change order or written modification did so at their own risk. Here, the letter did not state there would be a price modification, but merely indicated that the contract would be modified in some unspecified way in the future. This was insufficient to modify the contract, much less to effect the modification sought by petitioner (see, Delma Eng'g. Corp. v. 6455 Realty Co., 39 A.D.2d 846, affd 31 N.Y.2d 846; United States ex rel. Excavation Masonry Corp. v. A.C.S. Sys. Assocs., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5213).
We have considered petitioner's other arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.