The court properly denied defendant's motion to set aside the verdict based on juror misconduct. There is no basis upon which to disturb the court's determinations concerning credibility. As explained in the court's decision ( 183 Misc.2d 867), the juror's concealment of information during voir dire did not cause any prejudice that would entitle defendant to a new trial.
The prosecutor's isolated summation remark concerning the reaction of the defense witnesses to defendant's arrest, when viewed in context, did not draw an inference of guilt and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial (see, People v. D'Alessandro, 184 A.D.2d 114, 118-119, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 884).
The court properly found that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the first round of jury selection and properly denied defendant's application made pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky ( 476 U.S. 79) as to that round. Defendant's Batson challenge was based on minimal and uncorroborated statistical evidence that did not warrant an inference of intentional discrimination (see, People v. Jenkins, 84 N.Y.2d 1001). Defendant's claim that the court's finding of a pattern of discrimination in a subsequent round of jury selection required the same conclusion as to the first round is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would reject it (see, People v. Davis, 251 A.D.2d 137, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 895).
We find the sentence excessive to the extent indicated.
Defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would reject them.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.