MEMORANDUM
Order unanimously affirmed without costs.
This holdover proceeding involves a Section 8 lease agreement entered into by the parties in December 1994. Landlord contends that he terminated the Section 8 lease in 1998 by refusing to sign a renewal lease, tenant then became a month-to-month tenant, and he served her with a 30-day notice to vacate in April 2000.
When the parties first entered into the lease in 1994, Section 8 tenants had a statutory entitlement to continued occupancy absent good cause for eviction (see, 42 USCA § 1437f [dl [1] [B] [as amended by Pub.L. 97-35 § 326(e) 1981]; Mitchell v. United States Dept. of Hous. Urban Dev., 569 F. Supp. 701; see, Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342). In 1996, the automatic renewal provision was changed so that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (ii) (as amended by Pub.L. 104-134 § 101[e] [1996] and Pub.L. 105-276 § 549 [a] [2] [Al [1998]), "during the term of the lease the owner shall not terminate the tenancy except . . . for other good cause" (emphasis added). This change became permanent in 1998. However, there is no indication that it was intended to be applied retroactively to existing Section 8 leases containing automatic renewal provisions.
Since the lease term automatically renewed, it did not convert into a month-to-month tenancy upon landlord's refusal to sign a renewal lease. The only way landlord could have terminated the lease was for good cause shown pursuant to paragraph H of the lease addendum, which he failed to do. Moreover, since a Section 8 tenancy can only be terminated upon specified grounds, landlord was required to plead the basis for his termination of the Section 8 tenancy (see, Sanchez v. Vierra, NYLJ, Nov. 12, 1997 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]). In this case, neither the petition nor the 30-day notice states the basis for landlord's termination of the Section 8 tenancy. Accordingly, the petition was properly dismissed.