MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ANTOINETTE

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Docket Number

88331

Attorney(S)

Iseman, Cunningham Riester, Albany (Frederick C. Riester of counsel), for appellant. Siegel, Goldman, Mazzotta Siegel P.C., Albany (Jeffrey A. Siegel of counsel), for Edith Camp, respondent.

Judges

John A. Lahtinen

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Marie Antoinette (the decedent) died on January 16, 1991, leaving two wills. The first will, executed in April 1990, named her two grandnieces, including the petitioner, as sole beneficiaries. The second will, executed on July 24, 1990, left the residuary estate to respondent Edith Camp, the decedent's niece by marriage. Upon probate of the July 1990 will, the April 1990 will beneficiaries objected, alleging that the July will was procured by respondent's fraud and undue influence. A jury found the July 1990 will was the product of undue influence and Surrogate's Court denied its probate. This Court affirmed that decision on appeal.

The current petition concerns two investment accounts opened on July 31, 1990, in the decedent’s name with respondent as joint tenant with right of survivorship. The petitioner contended that respondent exerted undue influence in establishing these accounts. After a nonjury trial, Surrogate's Court held that the prior jury verdict did not collaterally estop respondent from litigating undue influence regarding the accounts and found petitioner failed to prove undue influence by a fair preponderance. The petitioner appeals this decree and subsequent orders awarding costs to the estate but denying interest and certain costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred respondent from contesting undue influence in the establishment of the joint tenancy accounts given the prior jury verdict on undue influence in the will contest.
Whether petitioner proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that respondent exerted undue influence upon decedent in establishing the joint tenancy accounts.
Whether the presumption under Banking Law § 675(b) properly applied to establish decedent’s intention to create a joint tenancy with survivorship rights in the investment accounts.
Whether Surrogate's Court erred in denying interest on costs awarded to the estate and in declining to award costs related to respondent's prior appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500	Doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues decided against a party in prior proceedings.	Used to analyze whether the prior jury verdict on undue influence in the will contest barred respondent from contesting undue influence in the joint tenancy accounts.
Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71	Collateral estoppel requires the precise issue to have been decided previously and be decisive of the present matter.	Supported the court’s conclusion that the issues in the will contest and the joint tenancy accounts were sufficiently distinct to preclude collateral estoppel.
Reed v. Whipple, 140 Mich. 7, 103 N.W. 548	Testimony of witnesses involved in a separate transaction is relevant and should not be barred by collateral estoppel.	Referenced to illustrate that different participants and transactions justify separate litigation of undue influence.
Sawhorse Lbr. More v. Perrotta, 279 A.D.2d 733, 734	Appellate courts defer to trial court credibility determinations.	Supported affirming Surrogate's Court’s credibility findings regarding undue influence on the accounts.
Matter of Coon, 148 A.D.2d 906, 908	Burden of proof for establishing joint tenancy intention under Banking Law § 675(b) lies with the party asserting such intention.	Supported the court’s correction that the burden should have been on respondent to establish decedent’s intent to create joint tenancy.
Hunt v. Hunt, 222 A.D.2d 759, 761	Appellate courts may review the record and grant judgment as warranted when errors in burden of proof occur.	Justified the court’s undertaking to review the record and affirm the joint tenancy despite the erroneous application of the presumption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed whether collateral estoppel barred respondent from contesting undue influence regarding the joint tenancy accounts. It concluded that although the will contest and the accounts involved similar issues of undue influence, they were sufficiently distinct transactions involving different participants, thus collateral estoppel did not apply. This allowed respondent to litigate undue influence anew with respect to the accounts.

Regarding the merits, the court deferred to Surrogate's Court’s credibility determinations, finding no basis to overturn the conclusion that petitioner failed to prove undue influence by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The court agreed with petitioner that Surrogate's Court erred in applying the presumption under Banking Law § 675(b) to establish decedent’s intent to create a joint tenancy. Ordinarily, this error would require reversal and a new hearing because the burden of proof should have been on respondent. However, upon reviewing the record, the court found sufficient evidence—testimony from the investment agency employee and documentary evidence—to establish decedent’s intent to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship under common law principles.

Finally, the court found that Surrogate's Court abused its discretion by denying interest on costs awarded to the estate and by not awarding costs related to respondent’s prior appeal, and thus modified the orders accordingly.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the decree denying undue influence regarding the joint tenancy accounts and affirmed the award of costs to the estate, but modified the orders to require the awarding of interest on those costs and costs related to the prior appeal.

The direct effect is that the joint tenancy accounts are recognized as intended by decedent, respondent is not found to have exerted undue influence over their creation, and the estate is entitled to interest on awarded costs and costs for the prior appeal. No new precedent was established beyond applying existing principles of collateral estoppel, burden of proof, and deference to credibility findings.

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In the Matter of the Estate of MARIE ANTOINETTE, Deceased. LAURIE M. GREENWOOD, as Executor of the Estate of MARIE ANTOINETTE, Deceased, Appellant; EDITH CAMP et al., Respondents.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Crew III, J.

Marie Antoinette (hereinafter decedent) died on January 16, 1991 leaving two wills. The first will was executed in April 1990 and named decedent's two grandnieces, one of whom is petitioner, as sole beneficiaries. The second will, executed on July 24, 1990, left decedent's residuary estate to respondent Edith Camp (hereinafter respondent), decedent's niece by marriage. Upon admission of the July 1990 will to probate by respondent, the beneficiaries of the April 1990 will objected claiming that the July 1990 will was procured by respondent's fraud and undue influence upon decedent. Following trial, a jury found that the July 1990 will indeed was the product of respondent's undue influence and, accordingly, Surrogate's Court denied admission of the will to probate. Following an appeal to this Court, we affirmed (Matter of Antoinette, 238 A.D.2d 762, 764).

The instant petition seeks to discover property withheld and to determine the estate's claim to two investment accounts opened on July 31, 1990 in the name of decedent with respondent as joint tenant with a right of survivorship. Petitioner contends that respondent asserted undue influence upon decedent with regard to the establishment of said accounts. Following a nonjury trial, Surrogate's Court held, inter alia, that the jury verdict regarding the July 1990 will contest did not collaterally estop respondent from litigating the issue of undue influence regarding the establishment of the investment accounts and found that petitioner failed to prove, by a fair preponderance of evidence, that respondent had, in fact, exerted undue influence upon decedent in the establishment of said accounts. Petitioner appeals from this decree.

Following this nonjury trial, Surrogate's Court rendered additional orders which, inter alia, awarded costs to decedent's estate against respondent, but denied interest thereon based upon the doctrine of laches and declined to award a bill of costs to decedent's estate following our April 1997 decision in the prior appeal from the jury verdict. Petitioner appeals from those orders as well.

It is axiomatic that application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent * * * proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior * * * proceeding and decided against that party * * *, whether or not the * * * causes of action are the same" (Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500). In order to invoke the doctrine, the proponent must demonstrate that the precise issue at bar was decided in the prior proceeding and is decisive of the present matter (see, e.g., Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71). That having been said, it seems self-evident that the issues involved in the will contest, while similar to those involved here, are sufficiently discrete to preclude invocation of the doctrine. The inquiries involve two separate and distinct transactions and, more importantly, involve different participants, so that if we were to permit invocation of the doctrine, respondent would be precluded from eliciting the testimony of, among others, Joseph Biondo, the employee of the investment agency who personally dealt with decedent in establishing the accounts in question (see, Reed v. Whipple, 140 Mich. 7, 103 N.W. 548:see generally, Annotation, Judgment Denying Validity of Will Because of Undue Influence, Lack of Mental Capacity, or the Like, as Res Judicata as to Validity of Another Will, Deed, or Other Instrument, 25 ALR2d 657).

With regard to petitioner's assertion that the findings of Surrogate's Court were against the weight of the credible evidence, we disagree. Petitioner's argument in that regard distills to a challenge of the court's resolution of credibility issues, which are entitled to considerable deference on our part (see, Sawhorse Lbr. More v. Perrotta, 279 A.D.2d 733, 734), and we cannot say that its conclusions could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence (see, id., at 734).

Petitioner is absolutely correct, however, in her assertion that Surrogate's Court erred in concluding that the presumption set forth in Banking Law § 675 (b) applied to the accounts created in this matter. In the ordinary course of events, reliance upon the presumption to establish decedent's intention to create a joint tenancy with survivorship rights would require reversal and remittal for a new hearing because the burden of proof should have been on respondent to establish such intention (see, Matter of Coon, 148 A.D.2d 906, 908). Given our broad scope of review, however, we will undertake to review the record and grant such judgment as is warranted (see, Hunt v. Hunt, 222 A.D.2d 759, 761). In so doing, we find that the record establishes that decedent, under common-law principles, intended to create a joint tenancy with survivorship rights. Such intention is established by Biondo's testimony that decedent personally advised him of her desire that the accounts be in the joint names of decedent and respondent with survivorship rights. Moreover, the documentary evidence in this matter, consisting of applications for said accounts completed by decedent and respondent for the opening of such accounts with respondent as a joint tenant and co-owner and the account statements, list both decedent and respondent as shareholders. That evidence, in our view, establishes that decedent intended to create a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship.

Upon our review of the record, we agree with petitioner's assertion that Surrogate's Court abused its discretion by failing to award petitioner interest on the bill of costs awarded to the estate against respondent. We likewise agree with petitioner that Surrogate's Court erred in not awarding her costs relative to respondent's prior appeal to this Court.

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the decree is affirmed, without costs.

ORDERED that the orders are modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as failed to award interest to the estate on the costs awarded to it against respondent and failed to award petitioner costs on the prior appeal; matter remitted to the Surrogate's Court of Rensselaer County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.