PATRICIA A. SEITZ, United States District Judge.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ D.E. No. 25]. out of a collision between two rental jet skis in the waters off the Bahamas between Plaintiff Barbara Mashburn ("Mashburn") and Mark Hommen ("Hommen"). In an earlier case arising out of this same incident (Case No. 97-2543-CIV-SEITZ), this Court held that Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. ("RCCL") was not liable to Mashburn and entered summary judgment in RCCL's favor. (D.E. No. 276, June 18, 1999). Specifically, this Court held that "nothing in the record hints that Royal Carribean violated a reasonable duty of care to assure the safety of those individuals choosing to rent a [jet ski]." ( Id.).
"Affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. 214 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. May 2, 2000).
Less than six months after the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling, Mashburn filed suit in state court seeking to hold RCCL liable for negligence arising out of its failure to provide passengers with liability insurance and/or advise them of the absence of such coverage. After removing the action to this Court, RCCL moves to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) the action is time-barred; and (3) the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Because Mashburn's complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the Court grants RCCL's motion.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a prior action from relitigating a cause of action that was or could have been raised in the earlier action. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Teledyne Industries, 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In this circuit, res judicata precludes claims which a plaintiff actually raised or could have raised in a prior suit when: (I) there is a final judgment in a prior suit on the merits; (2) the decision in the prior suit is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties in both suits are identical; and (4) both suits involve the same cause of action. O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). As to the fourth element, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that "if a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact . . . as a former action, [then] the two cases are really the same `claim' or `cause of action' for purposes of res judicata." a (citations omitted). Under this framework, Mashburn'S complaint is barred in its entirety.
RCCL is able to establish all four elements of a res judicata defense. First, on June 18, 1999, this Court entered final summary judgment in RCCL's favor after finding that Mashburn failed to offer evidence tending to prove that RCCL's negligence contributed to the accident or rendered the vessel unseaworthy in any manner which proximately caused the accident. Such an exoneration from liability constitutes a final judgment on the merits and thus, satisfies the first element. With respect to the second and third elements, neither party challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to enter a final judgment on the merits and Mashburn and RCCL were both parties to the previous action. Thus, the crux of Mashburn'S opposition to RCCL's motion focuses on the fourth element.
Although not explicitly stated in her response, it appears that Mashburn only contests whether RCCL can establish the fourth element of the defense, that is, whether both suits involve the same cause of action.
As stated above, the fourth element of a res judicata defense is that both lawsuits involve the same cause of action. Mashburn contends that her cause of action against RCCL for allowing Hommen to operate a jet ski without insurance did not accrue until at least liability against Hommen was established. Such a narrow interpretation of the res judicata doctrine is in direct conflict with the law of this Circuit. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2001) (" res judicata acts as a bar not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of fact.") (citations omitted). Thus, this Court must determine whether Mashburn's claims could have been brought in its previous action against RCCL.
Mashburn clearly could have pursued her present claims in the prior suit. Indeed, Mashburn learned early on in the previous litigation that there was no insurance or indemnity policy which would provide any coverage to jet ski users such as Hommen. (See Def.'s Mot., Exh. C). Thus, as the party that framed the scope of the previous litigation, Mashburn cannot now seek to relitigate matters which might have and should have been addressed in the previous action. In addition, there is no requirement that a Plaintiff be a judgment-creditor prior to bringing suit for failure to provide insurance coverage. Therefore, because both suits arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact and thus involve the same cause of action, the fourth element for a res judicata defense is also satisfied. Accordingly, so as to not allow the splitting of a single course of action in to separate suits, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot and this case is CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 1st day of March, 2002.