ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly refused to charge manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the second degree as lesser-included offenses of murder in the second degree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (see, People v. Martin, 59 N.Y.2d 704), there is no reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury rather than death, or that he failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions could result in the death of the victim (see, CPL 300.50; People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61; People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427).
We find no merit to the defendant's claim that he was denied a fundamental right to be present at sidebar conferences with prospective jurors during voir dire (see, People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247). His contention is belied by the record, which indicates that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to be present. Before the commencement of voir dire, in the defendant's presence, the defense counsel informed the trial court that he had explained to the defendant his right to be present and the defendant had agreed to waive it (see, People v. Smallwood, 225 A.D.2d 713; People v. Ming Yuen, 222 A.D.2d 613).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
FEUERSTEIN, J.P., O'BRIEN, LUCIANO and TOWNES, JJ., concur.