ORDERED that on the court's own motion, so much of the notice of appeal as purports to appeal as of right from the provision of the order that, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that provision of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter judgment against the defendant upon his default in answering, and dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). While the plaintiff's original motion for leave to enter a default judgment was timely, it was deemed abandoned when the plaintiff failed to settle an order granting the motion (see, 22 NYCRR 202.48) . The plaintiff's second motion for leave to enter a default judgment, made almost two years after the defendant's alleged default, was untimely (see, Richards v. Lewis, 243 A.D.2d 615; Home Sav. of Am. F.A. v. Gkanios, 230 A.D.2d 770; Bank of N.Y. v. Gray, 228 A.D.2d 399).
SMITH, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, McGINITY and H. MILLER, JJ., concur.