CAM CONSTRUCTION v. LAKE EDGEWOOD CONDOMINIUM

CAVANAGH, J.

We granted leave to consider whether a party may appeal an adverse summary disposition judgment on one count of a multicount action after accepting a case evaluation rendered under MCR 2.403. The plain language of MCR 2.403(M)(1) provides that a party's acceptance of a case evaluation disposes of "all claims in the action." We conclude, therefore, that, upon acceptance of a case evaluation under MCR 2.403, a party may not subsequently appeal an adverse summary disposition on one count in the action.

In August 1998, plaintiff CAM Construction filed a four-count complaint against defendant Lake Edgewood Condominium Association for damages stemming from defendant's failure to pay plaintiff for services rendered and breach of contract. In counts I, II, and III, plaintiff alleged that defendant owed $9,110 for services rendered pursuant to an agreement between the parties. In count IV, plaintiff alleged that defendant reneged on a separate contract, worth $183,450, by preventing plaintiff from performing roof construction work for defendant.

Defendant moved for summary disposition on count IV, claiming the contract was void under the statute of frauds. MCL 566.132(1)(a). The circuit court granted defendant's motion in December 1998 and plaintiff did not appeal that decision.

The case was then submitted to case evaluation, for which both parties submitted mediation summaries. The summaries briefly referred to the dismissal of count IV; however, the parties debate whether it was only the remaining counts the case evaluation panel discussed. The panel recommended defendant pay plaintiff $5,400, which both parties accepted. Defendant then asked for an order dismissing the entire case with prejudice under MCR 2.403(M)(1), which states:

If all the parties accept the panel's evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award is paid within 28 days after notification of the acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss the action with prejudice. The judgment or dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims in the action and includes all fees, costs, and interest to the date it is entered.

Plaintiff responded that it had reserved its right to appeal the summary disposition on count IV. Arguing that the case evaluation summaries had focused on the claims in counts I-III, plaintiff asserted that the $5,400 case evaluation award covered only that portion of the case.

The circuit court agreed with plaintiff and ordered the parties to:

Craft a judgment here that preserves the appellate issue on the issue that I decided and otherwise dismisses the case and shows this to be a final order in the-the final order in this case.[ ]

Plaintiff, thereafter, appealed the summary disposition on count IV.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in the following order:

[T]he claim of appeal is dismissed because appellant is not an aggrieved party. Under Reddam v Consumer Mortgage Corp, 182 Mich. App. 754; 452 N.W.2d 908 (1990), a party cannot appeal an earlier order entered after a subsequent acceptance of the mediation award.[ ]

Plaintiff applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

We review de novo decisions on summary disposition motions. Sewell v Southfield Pub Schs, 456 Mich. 670, 674; 576 N.W.2d 153 (1998). Similarly, interpretation of a court rule, like a matter of statutory interpretation, is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Marketos v American Employers Ins Co, 465 Mich. 407, 413; 633 N.W.2d 371 (2001).

Plaintiff contends that it can appeal an earlier partial summary disposition ruling where the parties have subsequently accepted a case evaluation award. We reject plaintiff's contention because it is contrary to the plain language of MCR 2.403(M)(1).

In Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich. 188, 193-194; 612 N.W.2d 116 (2000), we articulated the proper mode of interpreting a court rule:

When called on to construe a court rule, this Court applies the legal principles that govern the construction and application of statutes. McAuley v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich. 513, 518; 578 N.W.2d 282 (1998). Accordingly, we begin with the plain language of the court rule. When that language is unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, without further judicial construction or interpretation. See Tryc v Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135; 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). Similarly, common words must be understood to have their everyday, plain meaning. See MCL 8.3a; see also Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich. 602, 609; 608 N.W.2d 45 (2000).

MCR 2.403(M)(1) provides that, upon both parties' acceptance of a case evaluation, the judgment entered pursuant to that evaluation "shall be deemed to dispose of all claims in the action and includes all fees, costs, and interest. . . ." The plain meaning of the words at issue is as follows:

A "claim" is defined as:

1. The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court. . . . 2. The assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional. . . . 3. A demand for money or property to which one asserts a right. . . . [Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed).]

An "action" is defined as:

1. The process of doing something; conduct or behavior.

2. A thing done. . . . 3. A civil or criminal judicial proceeding. [ Id.]

Thus, according to the plain meaning of these words, a claim consists of facts giving rise to a right asserted in a judicial proceeding, which is an action. In other words, the action encompasses the claims asserted.

The language of MCR 2.403(M)(1) could not be more clear that accepting a case evaluation means that all claims in the action, even those summarily disposed, are dismissed. Thus, allowing bifurcation of the claims within such actions, as plaintiff suggests, would be directly contrary to the language of the rule. We, therefore, reject plaintiff's position because it is contrary to the court rule's unambiguous language that upon the parties' acceptance of a case evaluation all claims in the action be disposed.

Plaintiff cites numerous decisions of the Court of Appeals as supporting its position that it may except a claim from an action submitted to case evaluation under MCR 2.403. In Reddam, the Court of Appeals examined the former, less explicit version, of MCR 2.403, and explained that acceptance of a case evaluation is essentially a consent judgment, but that the parties may show they submitted less than all claims of an action to case evaluation.

The entry of a judgment pursuant to the acceptance of a mediation evaluation is, in essence, a consent judgment. See Pelshaw v Barnett, 170 Mich. App. 280, 286; 427 N.W.2d 616 (1988), modified on other grounds 431 Mich. 910; 433 N.W.2d 77 (1988). Furthermore, one may not appeal from a consent judgment, order or decree. Dybata v Kistler, 140 Mich. App. 65, 68; 362 N.W.2d 891 (1985). Finally, we agree with defendant that the mediation rule, MCR 2.403, envisions the submission of an entire civil action to mediation where monetary damages are involved and that the mediators shall evaluate the total valuation of the case. That is, absent a showing that less than all issues were submitted to mediation, a mediation award covers the entire matter and acceptance of that mediation award settles the entire matter. Accordingly, plaintiff's acceptance of the mediation award settled all claims, including those which had been dismissed by partial summary disposition. [ Reddam at 756-757.]

These principles were followed in subsequent Court of Appeals cases that construed the current version of MCR 2.403(M)(1). See Joan Automotive Industries, Inc v Check, 214 Mich. App. 383, 386-390; 543 N.W.2d 15 (1995), Bush v Mobil Oil Corp, 223 Mich. App. 222, 227; 565 N.W.2d 921 (1997), and Auto Club Ins Ass'n v State Farm Ins Cos, 221 Mich. App. 154, 166; 561 N.W.2d 445 (1997).

These decisions improperly allow a party to make a showing that "less than all issues were submitted" to case evaluation. Allowing the parties involved in the case evaluation process to make such a showing has no basis in the court rule. Even if Reddam permitted such an approach under the less detailed language of former MCR 2.403(M), there plainly is no warrant for proceeding in that manner under the language of the current version of MCR 2.403(M)(1):

If all the parties accept the panel's evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award is paid within 28 days after notification of the acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss the action with prejudice. The judgment or dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims in the action and includes all fees, costs, and interest to the date it is entered. [Emphasis added.]

As we have explained, this unambiguous language evidences our desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case evaluation. To the extent that Reddam and its progeny have been read to suggest that parties may except claims from case evaluation under the current rule, these cases are overruled. If all parties accept the panel's evaluation, the case is over.

In the present case, both parties accepted the panel's case evaluation, and defendant sent the required check within twenty-eight days. In those circumstances, the circuit court should have granted defendant's motion to dismiss, without condition or reservation. Thus, because the circuit court should have dismissed this case in its entirety, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed the plaintiff's claim of appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).

Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

KELLY, J. (dissenting).

I believe that the judge's statements on the record make clear that he intended plaintiff's appellate rights respecting count IV be preserved in the final order. It is obvious to me, also, that both the judge and plaintiff reasonably relied on the interpretation of MCR 2.403(M)(1) made by Reddam and its progeny. Therefore, it is unjust to apply a more strict reading of the court rule to this plaintiff's appeal. I would remand to the Court of Appeals for review of the summary disposition ruling on its merits.