HUGGINS v. LAMARQUE

NAPOLEON A JONES, JR., United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on a Report Recommendation ("R R") from Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes. On November 1, 2001, Magistrate Judge Stormes recommended that this Court DENY the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On November 21, 2001, Defendant, A.A. Lamarque, filed a document entitled "Objections to Report and Recommendation." Plaintiff Shaune Huggins then filed a "Reply to the Objections" on December 28, 2001. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DECLINES to adopt the Magistrate's recommendation.

This Court adopts the Magistrate's outhne of the facts in the Report and Recommendation.

I. Legal standard A. Magistrate R R

This Court must rereview objections to the Magistrate's R R under a de nova standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). After reviewing the factual and legal basis for the Magistrate's R R, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lackawanna County v. Coss, the Court declines to adopt the opinion of the Magistrate. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 121 S.Ct. 1567 (2001). This Court thus GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

B. Collateral Attack

Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on grounds that Plaintiff has no federal constitutional right to collaterally challenge a prior state conviction used to enhance a sentence. This issue has previously been addressed by the Supreme Court in its decision of U.S. v. Custis 114 S. Ct 1732 (1994). Custis states that a prisoner may not collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions that are used to enhance his sentence with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel. Id. at 1733. In regard to a collateral challenge through a habeas petition, the dicta in the Supreme Court decision left many courts undear as to the scope of the law. The Ninth's Circuit's inconsistent holdings interpreting the Custis decision reflect the complexity of this issue.

For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Custis holding was limited to collateral attacks at sentencing hearings. The court interpreted the Custis holding to permit collateral attacks on habeas review based on constitutional defects. The court specifically refused to limit such attacks to claims for violations of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1994). Likewise, the Court in United States v. Price read the Custis decision to hold that "defendants who wish to challenge the validity of prior convictions to be used for sentence enhancement have the constitutional right to do so only through habeas corpus." U.S. v. Price, 51 F.3d 175 (S. Ct 1995). Similarly to Brock, the Price court also declined to limit the constitutional basis for collateral attacks to Sixth Amendment claims. Id. at 177.

However, subsequent decisions have interpreted the Custis decision differently. In Clawson v. U.S., the court denied a motion for habeas corpus relief challenging the improper use of non-final state conviction for federal sentence enhancement purposes. ( Clawson v. United States, 52 F.3d 806 (9th Cit 1995). Also, in a more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit read Custis to "bar federal habeas review of the validity of a prior conviction used for federal sentencing enhancement unless the petitioner raises a [denial of counsel] claim." Contreras v. Schiltgen, 151 F.3d 906 (9th Cit 1998). The most recent decision in the Ninth Circuit on the subject leaves this question unanswered in this circuit See Allen v. State of Oregon, 153 F.3d 1046 (9th Cit 1998). However, the Supreme Court has recently resolved the issue. The Court ruled that "once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right . . . defendant generaily may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a federal habeas petition on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 1574 (2001). The Supreme Court thus extended its limitation to collaterally attack 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claims. Id. at 1570. The Court did not differentiate juvenile convictions from those obtained as an adult See Id (applying holding to prior juvenile convictions).

2. Analysis

Here, Shaune Lame Higgins, a state prisoner, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (R R at 1). In his petition, Huggins challenges his prior juvenile adjudications as violations of his federal constitutional rights of Due Process and Equal Protection. (R R at 4, 5). Huggins wishes to collaterally attack his prior convictions in order to invalidate the sentence enhancement pursuant* to California's Three Strikes Law. Cal. Penal Code § 667. Although Due Process and Equal Protection violations are solid claims under the Constitution, the Court has not recognized either claim as a vehicle for collateral attacks on prior state convictions. The Supreme Court has only recognized the denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment as a valid claim for a collateral attack on prior convictions. Lackawanna, 121 S.Ct. at 1574. Since the Petitioner's constitutional claims do not indude a denial of counsel, as required per Lackawanna, he may not collaterally attack his prior juvenile adjudication through a habeas claim as a vehicle for collateral attacks on prior state convictions. The Supreme Court has only recognized the denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment as a valid plaim for a collateral attack on prior convictions. Lackawanna, 121 S.Ct. at 1574. Since the Petitioner's constitutional claims do not include a denial of counsel, as required per Lackawanna, he may not collaterally attack his prior juvenile adjudication through a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court should therefore GRANT the Motion to Dismiss.

For the reasons set forth above, this Court DECLINES to ADOPT the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that this suit be DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.