The motion court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for violation of Judiciary Law § 487 since the allegations in the complaint failed to establish a chronic and extreme pattern of legal delinquency (see, Schindler v. Issler Schrage, P.C., 262 A.D.2d 226, 228, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 859) or that the actions of the attorney defendants caused plaintiff damages (Michalic v. Klat, 128 A.D.2d 505, 506; Di Prima v. Di Prima, 111 A.D.2d 901, 902).
Also proper was the motion court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for prima facie tort as barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations. A claim for damages for an intentional tort, including a tort not specifically listed in CPLR 215(3), is subject to a one-year limitation period (see, Gallagher v. Directors Guild of Am., 144 A.D.2d 261, 262-263, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 708), and where, as here, a reading of the factual allegations discloses that the essence of the cause of action is an intentional tort, plaintiff cannot avoid a Statute of Limitations bar by labeling the action as one to recover damages for a prima facie tort (see, Della Villa v. Constantino, 246 A.D.2d 867, 868; Entertainment Partners Group v. Davis, 198 A.D.2d 63). In any event, plaintiff failed to state a claim for prima facie tort since the allegations in the complaint fail to show that defendants-respondents acted with "disinterested malevolence" (see, Naturman v. Crain Communications, 216 A.D.2d 150), and fail to state with particularity the element of special damages (Broadway 67th St. Corp. v. City of New York, 100 A.D.2d 478, 486).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.