ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the hearing court properly found that the pretrial lineup was not unduly suggestive. There is no requirement that a defendant who participates in a lineup be accompanied by individuals who are nearly identical to him (see, People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, cert denied 498 U.S. 833). Furthermore, photographs of the lineup introduced into evidence at the hearing confirm that the lineup participants were seated so as to minimize any height disparities (see, People v. Wallace, 261 A.D.2d 493; People v. Gelzer, 224 A.D.2d 443).
The defendant's Batson claim (see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79) is also without merit. The court erroneously found that the defendant initially established a prima facie case that a prospective juror had been excused for an impermissible reason (see, People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 109). The defendant based his Batson challenge on the premise that the prosecutor impermissibly removed jurors who were "females under the age of 45" or "minority females under the age of 45". Since neither of these classifications constitute a cognizable racial group, the defendant failed to initially establish a prima facie case that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were employed for discriminatory purposes (see, People v. Smith, 81 N.Y.2d 875, 876; People v. Greene, 282 A.D.2d 757). Moreover, the prosecution advanced sufficient race-neutral explanations for exercising peremptory challenges against the two prospective jurors in question (see, People v. Payne, 88 N.Y.2d 172, 183; People v. Allen, supra). The trial court correctly determined that the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving that the explanations given by the prosecutor were pretextual (see, People v. Payne, supra; People v. White, 289 A.D.2d 270 [2d Dept., Dec. 3, 2001]; People v. Richie, 217 A.D.2d 84; see generally, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-365).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
RITTER, J.P., SMITH, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.