DON J. SVET, United States Magistrate Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Answers to First Set of Interrogatories and Responses to First Request for Production Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) filed March 11, 2002.
A magistrate judge's discovery order is reviewed under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Rule 72 mandates that a magistrate judge's order will neither be modified nor set aside in any way unless it is found to be clearly erroneous and contrary to law. See also Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d 1458, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1988); Comeau v. Rupp, 142 F.R.D. 683, 684 (D. Kan. 1992). This "clearly erroneous" standard allows the magistrate judge a free hand in managing discovery issues. Under this standard, the reviewing court must affirm the decision of a magistrate judge unless the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made, in other words, that the magistrate's ruling is clearly "in error." Possible error is not sufficient, nor will a mere difference of opinion suffice.Ocelot Oil Corp., 847 F.2d at 1464. Rather, because of the broad discretion afforded a magistrate judge in the resolution of nondispositive discovery disputes, the magistrate judge will be overruled only if the court concludes that the judge's discretion was abused.Comeau v. Rupp, 762 F. Supp. 1434, 1450 (D. Kan. 1991).
The limited review under Rule 72 is intentional. Management of discovery and resolution of discovery disputes comes within a magistrate judge's scope of authority. 28 U.S.C. § 636. Neither Congress nor the rule framers sought to encourage de novo review of discovery rulings. Thus, appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard means that the magistrate judge's ruling must stand, unless there is clear error or a clear abuse of discretion.
Here, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in compelling the production of trade secrets without ordering the parties to enter into a protective order. The decision whether trade secrets are relevant and whether the need outweighs the harm of disclosure is within the sound decision of the trial court. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steuere Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 326 (10th Cir. 1981). To demonstrate good cause to issue a protective order ". . . the initial inquiry is whether the moving party has shown that disclosure of the information will result in a `clearly defined and very serious injury.'" Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.R.D. 625, 627 (D.Kan. 1995). Plaintiff has sued Defendants for, inter alia, breach of contract. Plaintiff is seeking damages as a result of this breach. Defendants has asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract and is also seeking damages. The discovery sought by the Defendants clearly is relevant to these issues. Plaintiff's position that Defendants should not have access to this discovery is without merit. Any vague harm alleged by the Plaintiff is outweighed by the need of the Defendants to defend themselves and prosecute their claim.
IT IS THEREFOR ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's objection is overruled and the Magistrate Judge's Order is affirmed in all respects.