The trial court properly denied defendants' in limine motion to strike the jury demand, since plaintiffs' claims were primarily legal in nature and plaintiffs, under the facts alleged, could obtain full relief by means of a monetary award (see, Cadwalader Wickersham Taft v. Spinale, 177 A.D.2d 315, 316). We note in this connection that fraudulent conveyance claims which seek monetary damages only are legal in nature (see, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 48-50), as are claims for common-law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty primarily seeking monetary relief (see, Lipson v. The Dime Sav. Bank of New York, 203 A.D.2d 161), and claims for unjust enrichment where an award of money would fairly compensate the party bringing the claim (see, Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 222 A.D.2d 163, 168). A demand for punitive damages does not render such claims equitable (see, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods., 136 A.D.2d 229; Swersky v. Dreyer Traub, 219 A.D.2d 321, 328).
While defendants are correct that a foreclosure by a disinterested third party is not a "conveyance," within the meaning of the Debtor and Creditor Law, the jury expressly found in its special verdict that there was no default and therefore no right to foreclose, which finding was fully supported by the evidence, and thus the trial court properly denied defendants' post-trial motion to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance claims.
The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the assets of U-Vend, Inc., which plaintiffs claimed defendants fraudulently transferred, exceeded the amount of that company's debt to plaintiffs and that defendant Doniger, rather than defendant Anpres, Inc., took the assets of U-Vend for his personal benefit. Furthermore, he agreed to hold in trust for plaintiffs certain "ineligible receivables" that he actually succeeded in collecting and failed to remit after collection. Nor was the verdict on those issues against the weight of the evidence.
Although the trial court properly vacated the jury award of punitive damages since the jury charge on the matter could have misled or confused the jury, nevertheless, the evidence would have been sufficient to support the award, and therefore a new trial should be held on the issue of punitive damages.
We have considered the parties' remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them to be without merit.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.