BROWN v. PARKCHESTER SOUTH CONDOMINIUMS

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Docket Number

Docket No. 01-7790.

Attorney(S)

Joel E. Brown, pro se, Washingtonville, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant. James F. Berg, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Judges

Pierre Nelson Leval
Reena Raggi

Acts

The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Equal Employment Opportunities — Definitions
Labor — Age Discrimination In Employment — Congressional Statement Of Findings And Purpose
The Public Health And Welfare — Equal Opportunity For Individuals With Disabilities — Findings And Purpose

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff-appellant Joel Brown, proceeding pro se, sued his former employer Parkchester South Condominiums under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming improper termination from his position as a security guard. Parkchester moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that Brown failed to file his complaint within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Brown responded that a medical/mental condition prevented timely filing because he was unable to complete complex tasks. The district court (Knapp, J.) granted the motion, concluding equitable tolling was not warranted because Brown had not shown his condition rendered him incapable of complying with the deadline. Brown appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the district court erred in dismissing Brown's action for failure to file within the 90-day limitations period.
Whether equitable tolling of the filing deadline is warranted where the plaintiff alleges a mental or medical condition impaired his ability to file timely.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

Brown contended that his medical/mental condition prevented him from timely filing because it impaired his ability to complete complex tasks and may have caused him not to appreciate that he failed to attach the complaint to the summons.

Defendant-Appellee's Arguments

Parkchester moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting Brown failed to file the complaint within 90 days of receiving the EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
United States v. New York Medical College, 252 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2001)	Standard of review: dismissal of complaint reviewed de novo.	The court stated it reviews dismissal de novo and cited this case to support that standard.
South v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1994)	Equitable tolling has been applied where plaintiff actively pursued remedies but filed a defective pleading; also that failure to act diligently alone is not a basis for tolling.	The court relied on this precedent to explain when equitable tolling principles apply and to note that mere lack of diligence does not justify tolling.
Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2000)	Mental disability inquiries require a highly case-specific approach; courts may deny tolling where claims are conclusory and vague without particularized description.	The court cited Boos to emphasize the case-specific inquiry required and to contrast adequate evidentiary showing with conclusory claims.
Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1991)	Where claimant avers incapacity due to mental impairment during the limitations period, district court should permit presentation of evidence and may remand if incapacitation is shown.	The court compared Canales favorably as an example where tolling was permitted and used it to justify allowing evidence and an evidentiary hearing here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The panel reviewed the dismissal de novo. It explained equitable tolling is appropriate in some circumstances (e.g., where a plaintiff actively pursued remedies but filed a defective pleading) and that whether a mental disability warrants tolling is a highly case-specific inquiry. The court noted Brown had timely prepared and served a summons but there was evidence his medical condition might have prevented him from appreciating that he failed to attach the complaint. While acknowledging that failure to act diligently alone does not support tolling, the court held that where failure to comply may be attributable to a medical condition, tolling could be appropriate.

Because Parkchester had shown the complaint was not timely filed, the burden shifted to Brown to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact excusing the tardiness. The court found the limited record contained documentation of Brown's medical condition sufficiently close in time to the filing deadline to raise a reasonable inference about his condition at the pertinent time. Consequently, the court concluded an evidentiary hearing was appropriate to determine whether Brown's condition prevented timely filing. The court suggested Brown could obtain a more extensive medical history or expert testimony and left to the district court the discretion to consider appointing counsel to assist him.

Holding and Implications

VACATED the district court's judgment dismissing the action and REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing on whether Brown's medical condition warrants equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

Implications: The direct effect is to require the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess whether equitable tolling is appropriate in light of Brown's medical evidence; the court suggested possible appointment of counsel to assist Brown. The opinion applies existing circuit principles on equitable tolling and specifies a case-specific inquiry for mental/medical incapacity; it does not announce a novel, binding rule beyond those applications.

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Joel BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARKCHESTER SOUTH CONDOMINIUMS, Defendant-Appellee.

SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Joel Brown, pro se, appeals from a judgment dismissing his action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101- 213. Brown filed suit against Parkchester South Condominiums ("Parkchester"), his former employer.

In his complaint, Brown claimed that he had been improperly terminated from his position as a security guard at Parkchester. Thereafter, in the district court, Parkchester moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) based on Brown's failure to file his complaint within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In response, Brown argued that his medical condition prevented him from timely filing his complaint because he was unable to complete complex tasks. The district court (Knapp, J.) granted the motion, concluding that equitable tolling of the limitations period was not warranted because there had been no showing that Brown's medical condition rendered him incapable of complying with the deadline.

We review the dismissal of the complaint de novo. See United States v. New York Medical College, 252 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2001). Equitable tolling principles have been applied where the plaintiff "actively pursued judicial remedies" but filed a defective pleading during the specified time period. See South v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1994). The issue of whether a mental disability warrants equitable tolling of a filing deadline requires a "highly case-specific" inquiry. See Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that Social Security claimant who averred that mental disability prevented her from timely pursuing her federal claim had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a remand to district court for a determination as to whether equitable tolling was warranted)).

Although Brown did prepare and serve a summons on Parkchester in a timely fashion, there is evidence that his medical condition may have precluded him from appreciating that he had failed to attach a copy of the complaint to the summons. Certain mental and medical conditions, Brown argues, hinder him from following through on complex tasks. Although "a plaintiff's failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling," Saab Cars USA, 28 F.3d at 12, equitable tolling may be appropriate where the plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute of limitations is attributable to the plaintiff's medical condition. We recognize that drawing these distinctions can be difficult as "mental illnesses are as varied as physical illnesses, which is why our Circuit adheres to a case-specific approach," Boos, 201 F.3d at 185. Compare Canales, 936 F.2d at 759 ("Where a claimant avers incapacity due to mental impairment during the [limitations] period, the district court should permit the claimant to present evidence in support of this claim. If the claimant proves that she was incapacitated for any length of time during the [relevant] period, then the district court can determine whether, considering all of the circumstances of the case, equitable tolling is warranted."); with Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (denying equitable tolling, rejecting plaintiff's "conclusory and vague claim, without a particularized description of how her condition adversely affected her capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of her rights").

Upon the defendant's showing in support of its motion that the complaint was not timely filed, the burden fell on plaintiff to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that might excuse the tardy filing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Based on the limited record presented to the district court, it appears there may be substance to Brown's claim. Although the documentation of Brown's medical condition refers to his health during a time period following the expiration of the filing deadline, the documented period was sufficiently close in time to raise a reasonable inference as to his condition at the pertinent time. We therefore find that an evidentiary hearing is appropriate to determine to what extent, if any, Brown's condition did in fact inhibit his understanding or otherwise impair his ability to comply, such that equitable tolling would be in order. It could be helpful in such a hearing if Brown were to secure a more extensive medical history or medical expert testimony pertaining to the period leading up to the date on which filing was required.

Brown has averred that his medical condition has had a continuing and worsening effect on his mental state. This condition may hinder him from performing the process of collecting the necessary medical evidence. We leave it to the discretion of the district court to consider appointing counsel to assist in this endeavor.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing the action is hereby VACATED and the matter REMANDED for an evidentiary hearing as to whether Brown's medical condition warrants equitable tolling of the applicable filing deadline.