ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
In determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court should consider whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within the statutory 90-day period or a reasonable time thereafter, whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law 50-e[a]; [5]; Rabanar v. City of Yonkers, ___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept, Jan. 14, 2002]; Matter of Konstantinides v. City of New York, 278 A.D.2d 235; Matter of Turner v. Town of Oyster Bay, 268 A.D.2d 526). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioner's application for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the respondents. Even assuming that the petitioner's erroneous belief that the Long Island Railroad owned the parking lot where she fell constituted a reasonable excuse for her delay (see Matter of Flynn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 256 A.D.2d 341; Matter of Goldberg v. County of Suffolk, 227 A.D.2d 482), neither respondent had notice of the facts underlying the petitioner's claim until she sought leave to serve a late notice of claim upon them. Furthermore, given the transitory nature of the alleged defect in the pavement of the parking lot, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the delay would prejudice the respondents' ability to investigate the defect and other circumstances surrounding the accident (see Matter of Konstantinides v. City of New York, supra; Matter of Turner v. Town of Oyster Bay, supra; Matter of Gofman v. City of New York, 268 A.D.2d 588; Matter of Embery v. City of New York, 250 A.D.2d 611).
FLORIO, J.P., SMITH, KRAUSMAN and TOWNES, JJ., concur.