ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the mother's contentions, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the conclusion that she is, by reason of mental illness, presently and for the foreseeable future unable to provide proper and adequate care for her daughter (see Social Services Law § 384-b[c]; Matter of Pariis L., 286 A.D.2d 501, 502; Matter of Laura D., 270 A.D.2d 260, 261; Matter of Virginia Denise R., 249 A.D.2d 400; Matter of Donald B., 151 A.D.2d 477, 478). After interviewing the mother and reviewing the mother's hospital records, a court-appointed psychiatrist testified that the mother suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. He opined that because of the long-term nature of the illness, the severity of the symptoms that have manifested, and the mother's noncompliance with treatment, the child, if returned to the mother, would be at risk of being neglected in the present and in the foreseeable future. This evidence supported the Family Court's findings (see Matter of Pariis L., supra; Matter of Laura D., supra; Matter of Virginia Denise R.; Matter of Donald B., supra).
The Family Court providently exercised its discretion by not conducting a separate dispositional hearing (see Matter of Joyce T., 65 N.Y.2d 39, 46).
FLORIO, J.P., SMITH, KRAUSMAN and TOWNES, JJ., concur.