ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Judicial review of separation agreements is to be exercised sparingly, with a goal of encouraging parties to settle their differences on their own (see Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63). A party seeking to set aside a separation agreement which is fair on its face must prove fraud, duress, overreaching, or that the agreement is unconscionable (see Christian v. Christian, supra at 73; Collison-Harrington v. Harrington, 279 A.D.2d 444; Wilson v. Neppell, 253 A.D.2d 493). The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is not entitled to set aside the separation agreement (see Collison-Harrington v. Harrington, supra; Piccone v. Chamberlain, 271 A.D.2d 667; Wilson v. Neppell, supra; Wasserman v. Wasserman, 217 A.D.2d 544; Middleton v. Middleton, 174 A.D.2d 655; Springer v. Grattan-Arnoff, 172 A.D.2d 1084; Greenfield v. Greenfield, 147 A.D.2d 440). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issues of fact, since his allegations are insufficient to create an inference of fraud, duress, overreaching, or unconscionability (see Kammerer v. Kammerer, 278 A.D.2d 282; Wilson v. Neppell, supra at 494; Surlack v. Surlack, 95 A.D.2d 371). Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly granted.
SANTUCCI, J.P., FLORIO, GOLDSTEIN and TOWNES, JJ., concur.