The court properly exercised its discretion in declining to order a further competency hearing, since it reasonably concluded, based on the psychiatric report issued at the time of defendant's most recent competency proceedings, and on its own observations of defendant, that he was not incapacitated (see, People v. Morgan, 87 N.Y.2d 878). The record of defendant's various competency proceedings supports the conclusion that defendant was never psychotic. Rather, he was adept at feigning psychotic symptoms, a skill he had the opportunity to develop and hone during his long-standing history and repeated encounters with the criminal justice system. The information presented by defense counsel in support of his request for a new competency hearing was completely consistent with defendant's demonstrated pattern of malingering (see,People v. Williams, 282 A.D.2d 224, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 869). Furthermore, the record, including defendant's responses to the court at the plea allocution, establishes that defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and unaffected by his purported mental illness (see, People v. Alexander, N.Y.2d [Mar 21, 2002], 2002 N.Y. LEXIS 545).
Defendant's valid waiver of the right to appeal expressly encompassed his suppression and excessive sentence claims (see, People v. Kemp, 94 N.Y.2d 831). Accordingly, appellate review of each of those claims is foreclosed. In any event, both claims are without merit.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.