ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
An owner or a lessee is under no duty to pedestrians to remove ice and snow that naturally accumulates upon the sidewalk in front of its premises (see Booth v. City of New York, 272 A.D.2d 357; Lakhan v. Singh, 269 A.D.2d 427). The failure to remove all of the snow is not negligence (see Spicehandler v. City of New York, 303 N.Y. 946; Kennedy v. C C New Main Street Corp., 269 A.D.2d 499, 500), and liability will not result unless it is shown that the owner or lessee made the sidewalk more hazardous by its attempts at removal (see Lakhan v. Singh, supra; Velez v. City of New York, 257 A.D.2d 570, 571).
The appellants presented evidence which established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to her contention that the appellants made the sidewalk more hazardous by removing or attempting to remove snow and ice (see Klein v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 A.D.2d 420; Lakhan v. Singh, supra; Velez v. City of New York, supra). In fact, the plaintiff testified at her examination before trial that the sidewalk where she fell had not been shoveled or cleared.
FEUERSTEIN, J.P., SCHMIDT, ADAMS and CRANE, JJ., concur.