The motion court correctly found that the absolute pollution clause relied upon by defendant insurers cannot be reasonably and fairly interpreted except to exclude the underlying claims arising from the discharge of mining waste from coverage (see, Vigilant Ins. Co. v. V.I. Techs., 253 A.D.2d 401, 402, lv dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 999). Even if mining waste can be used as a commercial product, it is nonetheless covered by the absolute pollution exclusion, since indisputably hazardous substances were released into the open environment (cf., Roofers' Joint Training, Apprentice Educ. Comm. v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 275 A.D.2d 90), making this a case "where the damages alleged are truly environmental in nature, [and] where the underlying complaint alleges damages resulting from what can accurately be described as the pollution of the environment" (see, Belt Painting Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 293 A.D.2d 206, 210-211; 2002 N.Y. A.D. LEXIS 5146). The hazardous substances are not rendered non-polluting by the fact that they are naturally occurring (see, Space v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 235 A.D.2d 797, 798), since, in this case, the hazardous material "is not found in its unaltered form because mining, an unnatural process, has altered its location" (see, Monarch Greenback v. Monticello Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp.2d 1068, 1080).
All of plaintiffs' remaining arguments have been rendered moot by their settlement with all defendants except Federal Insurance Company.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.