Plaintiff's State law claim against District Attorney Morgenthau for negligent hiring, supervision and training was properly dismissed, since plaintiff's General Municipal Law § 50-e notice failed to assert such a claim or allege any facts from which defendant could have gleaned plaintiff's intention to raise such a claim (see, Urena v. City of New York, 221 A.D.2d 429; Brown v. New York City Tr. Auth., 172 A.D.2d 178, 180; St. John v. Town of Marlborough, 163 A.D.2d 761, 763).
Plaintiff's remaining State law claims against District Attorney Morgenthau, seeking to hold him vicariously accountable for the acts or omissions of his subordinates, were also properly dismissed, since claims premised on vicarious liability do not lie against the head of a county agency (see, County Law §§ 54, 941; Barr v. County of Albany, 50 N.Y.2d 247, 257).
Plaintiff's claim against District Attorney Morgenthau predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was also properly dismissed, since plaintiff has failed to allege direct participation by him in the alleged wrongful acts, a failure by him to remedy a wrong after discovering it, a policy or custom in the District Attorney's Office which encouraged or permitted the alleged wrongful acts, or gross negligence in District Attorney Morgenthau's supervision of his subordinates (see, McKeon v. Daley, 101 F. Supp.2d 79, 91, affd 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10503 [2d Cir]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.