MORGAN v. CITY OF WACO, (N.D.Tex. 2002)

JEFF KAPLAN, United States Magistrate Judge

Defendants City of Rockwall, Carl Alsabrook, John Knight, and Edward Fowler (collectively referred to as "Rockwall defendants") have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated herein, the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On or about November 21, 2000, an arrest warrant was issued for plaintiff after his wife filed charges with the Waco Police Department. (Plf. First Am. Compl. at 2). Plaintiff was arrested the next day in Greenville, Texas. (Id. at 3). On December 1, 2000, the prosecutor dismissed the charges against plaintiff for insufficient evidence. (Id.). Disappointed with the outcome, plaintiff's wife complained to Waco Police Detective Loudermilk who allegedly "re-entered the executed November 21, 2000 warrant into the teletype and requested the Rockwall Police Department to again arrest the Plaintiff on the same charges." (Id.). Rockwall Police Officers Alsabrook, Knight, and Fowler arrested plaintiff on January 12, 2001. (Id.). He was booked into the Rockwall County Jail, fingerprinted, photographed, and posted a $5,000 bond. (Id. at 4). In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the City of Rockwall and the City of Waco breached their duty to adequately supervise their police officers and have promulgated unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices which give officers unfettered discretion to make arrests without a warrant or probable cause. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff also sues the individual officers for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful warrantless arrest and for malicious prosecution. (Id. at 5-6).

The Rockwall defendants now move to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City contends that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts giving rise to a claim of municipal liability and that it is not liable for punitive damages as a matter of law. The individual police officers move to dismiss all federal and state claims asserted against them in their official capacity because such claims "are redundant of those against the City of Rockwall . . ." (Def. Mot. at 8). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is ripe for determination.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas AM University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997), quoting Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 729 (1983). A district court may dismiss a complaint "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and the allegations contained therein must be taken as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

The exacting standards governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be considered in light of the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). In what has been characterized as a "seminal pleading case," the Supreme Court recently reminded lower courts that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 922, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions. Id., 122 S.Ct. at 998. Except in a limited set of cases, a plaintiff is not required to plead facts supporting each and every element of his claim or legal theory. Id. Rather, a complaint is sufficient if it "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id., quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002) (interpreting Swierkiewicz to mean that "[a] complaint that complies with the federal rules of civil procedure cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is conclusory or fails to allege facts"); Greenier v. Pace, Local No. 1188, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2002 WL 731714 at *1 (D. Me. Apr. 23, 2002) ("Swierkiewicz clearly indicates that it is not fatal to plaintiff's case that some of his allegations at this stage may be legal conclusions rather than facts."). Liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions, not motions to dismiss, should be used to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. See Swierkiewicz, 122 S.Ct. at 998.

Applying the relevant standards, plaintiff's allegations against the City of Rockwall satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a). Plaintiff alleges that:

Defendant City of Rockwall had deficient policies, procedures, practices and customs in the way warrants from other municipalities and agencies are confirmed and by allowing its law enforcement officers unfettered discretion in effectuating arrests without a valid warrant or probable cause and in effectuating the multiple arrests of its citizens on a single warrant.

The Defendant City of Rockwall delegated its policy making authority regarding warrant and arrest procedures and policies to the Rockwall Police Department and its officers. The deficient policies and procedures were deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff. The deficient policies directly caused injury to Plaintiff by violating his constitutional rights . . .

(Plf. First Am. Compl. at 5). These allegations, although thin, are sufficient to place the City on notice of plaintiffs' claims and, if proved, may give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Rockwall Defendants further argue that the City it is not liable for punitive damages and the individual officers cannot be sued in their official capacity. In his response, plaintiff concedes that punitive damages cannot be assessed against the City. (Plf. Resp. at 5). He also makes clear that Alsabrook, Knight, and Fowler are sued only in their individual capacity. (Id. at 6). Based on these representations, the Court should dismiss the punitive damage claim against the City and any official capacity claims brought against the individual defendants.

Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part. The motion should be granted to the extent that plaintiff asserts a claim for punitive damages against the City of Rockwall and has sued Carl Alsabrook, John Knight, and Edward Fowler in their official capacity. In all other respects, the motion should be denied.