ANITA B. BRODY, United States District Judge
Petitioner Scot Reinert ("Reinert") brings this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for first-degree murder. I referred the petition to United States Magistrate Judge James R. Melinson for a Report and Recommendation ("RR") in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate Judge Melinson filed the RR, recommending that I deny the petition. Reinert filed timely objections. For the reasons set forth below, I will overrule Reinert's objections, adopt the RR as supplemented by this Memorandum, and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
I. Background and Procedural History
The Magistrate's RR contains a full recitation of the factual background of Reinert's case.
On January 31, 1992, following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Scot Reinert was convicted of murder in the first degree. On November 15, 1994, the trial court denied Reinert's post-sentencing motions. Commonwealth v. Reinert, No. 1128/1991, slip op. (Lehigh C.C.P. Nov. 15, 1994) ("Reinert I"). Reinert appealed.
On January 23, 1996, on direct appeal the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Commonwealth v. Reinert, No. 4349 Phila. 1994, slip op. (Pa.Super.Ct. January 23, 1996) ("Reinert II"). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Reinert's petition for allowance of appeal on September 26, 1996. Commonwealth v. Reinert, 682 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1996) (table). On October 6, 1997, the United States Supreme Court denied Reinert's petition for a writ of certiorari. Reinert v. Pennsylvania, 522 U.S. 810 (1997).
On October 2, 1998, Reinert filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. I referred the petition to Magistrate Judge Melinson, who recommended on May 27, 1999 that the petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies. On July 13, 2000, I adopted Magistrate Judge Melinson's Report and Recommendation, but amended the Order to permit Reinert to withdraw his unexhausted claims and proceed with the remaining claims. The grant of the request to amend the petition was memorialized in an Order on July 13, 2000. On November 30, 2000, Reinert filed the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On May 17, 2001, Magistrate Judge Melinson issued his RR, finding that Reinert was not entitled to habeas relief under any of the claims raised in his amended petition, and therefore recommending that Reinert's amended petition be denied with prejudice. On August 1, 2001, Reinert filed objections to Magistrate Judge Melinson's RR. I will approve and adopt the RR as supplemented by this memorandum.
II. Standard of Review
Where a petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been referred to a magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation, the district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report.., to which objection is made... [The court] may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations of the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
A. Review of Claims Under Section 2254 28 U.S.C. § 2254 authorizes federal courts to grant habeas relief to a prisoner "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a).
Habeas corpus relief shall be granted if the state court judgment: (1) was contrary to. . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; (2) "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or (3) was the result of "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented" in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).
A state court judgment is "contrary to clearly established Federal law" if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
A state court judgment "involve[s] an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle.., but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. To be an unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, the state court's application must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409; Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197 (3d Cir. 2001). In determining whether the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable, habeas courts may consider the decisions of inferior federal courts. Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999).
State court factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C § 2254 provides: "In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence."
B. Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Several of Reinert's claims allege ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial attorneys. Claims of ineffective assistance are analyzed under the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to merit habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel, Reinert must establish that (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See id. at 689. Strickland establishes a demanding standard of ineffectiveness that requires a habeas petitioner to prove the "gross incompetence" of his counsel. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). Where counsel failed to raise a meritless claim, habeas relief under Strickland is not available. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Holland v. Horn, 150 F. Supp.2d 106, 770 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Holloway v. Horn, 161 F. Supp.2d 452, 583-84 (E.D. Pa. 2001). To establish prejudice, Reinert must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.