MAHAN, J.
The mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child. We reverse.
Background Facts and Proceedings. Rhonda is the mother of Joshua, born March 22, 1991. On December 6, 2001, the State filed a petition to terminate Rhonda's parental rights, which alleged:
That termination of the parental rights of Rhonda and the father, as parents of the child in interest, should be made upon the grounds set forth in Iowa Code Section 232.2(6)(C)(2) (6)(N)
, in that (1) the child has been adjudicated to be a Child In Need of Assistance pursuant to Section 232.96, (2) the child had been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for period of at least six consecutive months, and (3) there is clear an convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant meaningful contact with the child during the previous six months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so; and Section 232.116(1)(b) in that (1) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child has been abandoned or deserted, (2) The child has been adjudicated a Child in Need of Assistance pursuant to Section 232.96, (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days, and (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in Section 232.102 at the present time.
Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Rhonda's parental rights. In its ruling the court made conclusions of law regarding "abandonment of a child," and the requirements for termination of parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(e). The court then concluded Rhonda's parental rights should be terminated, without specifying the exact grounds for termination. It appears from the ruling, however, that Rhonda's parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b) and (e) (2001). Rhonda appeals.
The State did not allege Rhonda's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to this section. In addition, in its order terminating parental rights, the court cites to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b) and (e). However, the applicable law in this termination is correctly cited as Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b) and (f) (Supp. 2001) due to an amendment to section 232.116 that renumbered the sections but did not substantively alter them.
Standard of Review. We review termination proceedings de novo. In re C.B., 611 N .W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. Id. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
Termination of Parental Rights. Rhonda claims she was denied due process of the law when the juvenile court found a basis for termination not alleged in the petition. A parent has the right to due process and a fair trial when the State seeks to terminate parental rights. In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); see also Alsager v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D.Iowa 1975), aff'd in part 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Due process requires fundamental fairness in a judicial proceeding. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 648 (1981). A parent's right to have custody of his or her child should be terminated only with the utilizations of the required constitutional safeguards. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923); In re T.R., 460 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). "It is a denial of due process to adjudicate a termination of parental rights on a ground of which the children and parents have not had proper notice." In re Robbins, 230 N.W.2d 489, 491 (Iowa 1975).
The State contends that Rhonda has failed to preserve error on the issue because the juvenile court did not address this issue, and she failed to bring the issue to the attention of the court in an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion. The issue of whether or not to legally sever the biological ties between parent and child is an issue of grave importance with serious repercussions for the child as well as the biological parents. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Because of the seriousness of the issue and errors involved, we will assume without deciding that error was preserved and will proceed to discuss the merits of this issue.
In the present case, the petition to terminate Rhonda's parental rights and the juvenile court's ruling contained several errors. The petition incorrectly stated the applicable code sections as Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (6)(n) as opposed to 232.116(1)(d). The petition also failed to specify the correct elements for termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(b). In addition, the juvenile court appears to have terminated Rhonda's parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(e). The court clearly lacked authority to terminate Rhonda's rights under this section since the State did not plead this section in the termination petition. See id. The juvenile court also failed to make written findings, as required by section 232.117, as to whether the facts were sufficient to terminate Rhonda's parental rights with regard to section 232.116(1)(d).
On appeal the State concedes that the elements of section 232.116(1)(b) were not shown by clear and convincing evidence.
After a careful review of the record, we conclude the aforementioned errors deprived Rhonda of fundamental fairness in these proceedings. We recognize the time pressures facing busy juvenile judges and county attorneys in such a high volume court. However, taking a child away from the care and custody of a parent has serious consequences. Accordingly, we reverse.
REVERSED.