DIANE K. VESCOVO, United States Magistrate Judge
Currently before the court is defendant Mueller Copper Tube Products, Inc.'s ("Mueller") motion to compel Section 107 plaintiffs and Section 113 plaintiffs to respond to its Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents filed on February 20, 2002. Mueller claims that plaintiffs have had ample time to respond to its discovery requests and have done so, at best, in an incomplete fashion. It therefore also seeks sanctions for the plaintiffs' lack of compliance with the Case Management Order. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the Section 113 plaintiffs relieved themselves of the obligation to respond to Mueller's discovery requests, as they have stipulated to their liability pursuant to the Case Management Order filed January 12, 2O01. They further argue that they have served additional supplemental responses on Mueller in accordance with its demands.
"Section 107 plaintiffs" refers to the relief sought by these plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607 and includes: Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Hoehn Motors, Inc.; Kimberly-Clark Corporation; Norfolk Southern Railway Co.; Shell Oil Company, Trailmobile, Inc.; and Union Oil Company of California d/b/a Unocal.
"Section 113 plaintiffs" refers to the relief sought by these plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613 and includes: Signature Combs, Inc.; Agrico Chemical Co.; BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.; Bluff City Buick, Co., Inc.; Burlington Northern Railroad; Carrier Excavation Foundation Co., Inc.; Chevron Chemical Co.; Chuck Hutton Co.; City of Memphis; The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Memphis, Tennessee; E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., Inc.; Exxon Corporation; The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.; Greyhound Lines, Inc.; Haygood Group, Inc.; The Hertz Corporation; Illinois Central Railroad Co.; Kellogg Company; Kraft Foods, Inc.; The Kroger Company; Memphis Area Transit Authority; Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division; Navistar International Transportation Co.; Phillips Petroleum Co.; Ryder; Sara Lee Corporation; Schilling Lincoln Mercury/Union Avenue, Inc.; Sears Roebuck Co.; Shelby County Government; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.; Texaco Inc.; Texas Gas Transmission Corp.; Tri-State Mack; Trunkline Gas Co.; Viad Corp. (formerly The Dial Corp.); W.R. Grace Co.; White Rose; and Yokohoma Tire Corp.
As this Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") case has been in existence since 1998, the facts, as complex as they may be, have been set out in painstaking detail in many previous orders in this action and will not be restated here.
Mueller argues that the plaintiffs that have designated themselves as Section 113 plaintiffs must still respond to discovery requests. The Section 113 plaintiffs aver that they have stipulated to their liability in the pollution of the two Superfund sites used by Gurley Oil for waste oil disposal. Based on the Case Management Order, "[a]ny party that stipulates to liability in this cause shall be relieved of its obligations to respond to Phase II discovery, unless otherwise ordered by the Court." (See Case Management Order, Jan. 12, 2001.) Each of the Section 113 plaintiffs subsequently stipulated that:
(i) for a period of time between January 1, 1959 and January 1, 1976 it generated waste oil in the course of its operation, (ii) that it arranged for or allowed a portion of that waste to be hauled by Gurley Oil, (iii) that Gurley's waste oil re-refining processes generated both acid sludge waste and filter clay waste, (iv) that the acid sludge waste and the filter clay waste contained hazardous substance, (v) that the acid sludge waste and filter clay waste was hauled by Gurley and deposited initially at the South 8th Street Superfund Site from approximately January 1, 1959 to July 1, 1970 and later deposited at the Gurley Pit Superfund Site from approximately July 1, 1970 to January 1, 1976, (vi) that the disposition of these wastes at both the South 8th Street Superfund Site and the Gurley Pit Superfund Site created a threat of release of a hazardous substance form each of those facilities, and (vii) that plaintiff is a signatory to the Gurley Related Sites Consent Decree and has, therefore, resolved its liability to the United States and the State of Arkansas in a judicially approved settlement pursuant to CERCLA § 113(f).
Only the Section 113 plaintiffs that have effectively stipulated to their liability, as set forth above, without reservation and without a qualification that it is valid for discovery purposes only, are relieved from the duty to respond to Muller's discovery requests. Any plaintiff who has not signed an unequivocal stipulation of liability in this cause must respond to Mueller's discovery requests.
As it seems that all Section 113 plaintiffs signed the stipulation with the qualification that it is only effective to relieve them from the obligations of discovery, the Section 113 plaintiffs may submit unqualified stipulations of liability in lieu of a discovery response within the allotted time under the rules from the date of this order. Otherwise, they must respond to Mueller's discovery requests.
The plaintiffs stated in their memorandum in response to Mueller's motion to compel that they served supplemental responses to Mueller's interrogatories and requests for production of documents two days after Mueller filed the instant motion to compel with this court. The court is therefore unable to determine if some of the issues complained of by Mueller have been resolved by plaintiffs' supplemental responses. Accordingly, Mueller's motion to compel is moot and is denied without prejudice. If after fully reviewing plaintiffs' latest supplemental responses, Mueller still believes that plaintiffs have failed to fully respond to its requests or interrogatories, Mueller shall set forth each specific interrogatory or request thusly disputed, and shall provide the court with an explanation of how it is incomplete or nonresponsive.
Mueller served 21 interrogatories and 13 requests for production of documents on the plaintiffs in this case. Its generalized objections to plaintiffs' responses means that the court would be forced to sift through the 272 responses to each individual request and interrogatory submitted by plaintiffs to determine which response is sufficient and which is not. Further, Mueller has not fully reviewed the supplemental responses submitted by the plaintiffs, which could resolve much of the current dispute between the parties. Accordingly, Muller's motion to compel is moot.
Further, each party (defendant and plaintiffs) shall create and provide to the other side a privilege log, setting forth the following information for each specific document: 1) description/topic of document; 2) date of document; 3) author(s) of document; 4) author's role/position; 5) recipient(s) of document (including those copied); 6) recipient's role/position; and 7) privilege asserted. Parties may only assert privileges recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise the party opposing a request for a document runs the highly probable risk that the request will be granted. The privilege logs shall be served on the respective parties within two weeks of the date of this order.
Mueller also seeks sanctions in its motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), as the plaintiffs have taken an inordinate amount of time to respond to Mueller's discovery requests. The court notes, however, that both parties have failed to make genuine efforts to resolve this matter amicably. Because both parties, rather than just the plaintiffs, seem unwilling to yield or cooperate with each other, sanctions against the plaintiffs shall not be imposed at this time. The parties are encouraged, however, for the sake of judicial efficiency and professional courtesy, to resolve discovery disputes in a less adversarial manner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.