We reject plaintiff's argument that as a degree holder he is in a fundamentally different position from the plaintiffs in cases holding that a university has no legal obligation to provide a diploma or transcript to a graduating student or former student with outstanding financial obligations to the university (see, Gray v. St. John's Univ., 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1044 [App Term, 1st Dept]; Martin v. Pratt Inst., 278 A.D.2d 390 [2d Dept], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 715; Matter of Spas v. Wharton, 106 Misc.2d 180 [Sup Ct, Albany County]). There is no merit to plaintiff's argument that defendant's refusal to forward his transcript to graduate schools effectively revokes his degree in violation of defendant's charter, Education Law § 226(9), and an implied promise by a university to its graduates not to interfere with the privileges and immunities of his or her degree. The challenged policy is clearly "expedient for carrying into effect the designs of [defendant's] institution", as expressly permitted by its charter, and, while the policy may compromise plaintiff's applications to graduate schools, it does not revoke defendant's certification that plaintiff possesses all of the knowledge and skills represented by the degree.
Plaintiff's other causes of action all lack merit. The breach of contract claim, based on an alleged, post-degree agreement under which plaintiff gave defendant a promissory note in exchange for defendant's promise to release his transcript, does not allege the essential terms of the note or the agreement in nonconclusory language, or plaintiff's performance of his obligations thereunder (see, Matter of Sud v. Sud, 211 A.D.2d 423, 424). Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because the challenged policy does not violate defendant's charter or the law, and also because the policy is not so outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be utterly intolerable in a civilized community (see, Wolkstein v. Morgenstern, 275 A.D.2d 635, 636-637). Plaintiff's fraud claim, based on an allegation that defendant misrepresented to him that it would release his transcript if he obtained a bank loan and used it to reduce his obligation to the university, should have been dismissed because plaintiff could not have been defrauded into doing what he was already legally bound to do, i.e., pay his tuition (see, Megaris Furs v. Gimbel Bros., 172 A.D.2d 209, 212). Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim, based on the same alleged misrepresentation, should also have been dismissed, since, at the time of the alleged misrepresentation, the parties were clearly acting at arm's length (see, Kimmell v. Schaefer, 89 N.Y.2d 257, 263). We have considered and rejected plaintiff's other arguments.
Motion seeking leave to strike reply brief granted.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.